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PREFACE 
In response to Air Force Secretary James G. Roche’s charge to reinvigorate the systems 
engineering profession, the Air Force Institute of Technology (AFIT) undertook a broad 
spectrum of initiatives that included creating new and innovative instructional material.  The 
Institute envisioned case studies on past programs as one of these new tools for teaching the 
principles of systems engineering. 
Four case studies, the first set in a planned series, were developed with the oversight of 
the Subcommittee on Systems Engineering to the Air University Board of Visitors.  The 
Subcommittee includes the following distinguished individuals: 
Chairman 
Dr. Alex Levis, AF/ST 
Members 
Brigadier General Tom Sheridan, AFSPC/DR 
Dr. Daniel Stewart, AFMC/CD 
Dr. George Friedman, University of Southern California 
Dr. Andrew Sage, George Mason University 
Dr. Elliot Axelband, University of Southern California 
Dr. Dennis Buede, Innovative Decisions Inc. 
Dr. Dave Evans, Aerospace Institute 
Dr. Levis and the Subcommittee on Systems Engineering crafted the idea of publishing 
these case studies, reviewed several proposals, selected four systems as the initial cases for 
study, and continued to provide guidance throughout their development.  The Subcommittee’s 
leading minds in systems engineering have been a guiding force to charter, review, and approve 
the work of the authors.  The four case studies produced in this series are the C-5 Galaxy, the F-
111, the Hubble Space Telescope, and the Theater Battle Management Core System.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Approved for Public Release; Distribution Unlimited 
 
The views expressed in this Case Study are those of the author(s) and do not reflect the 
official policy or position of the United States Air Force, the Department of Defense, or the 
United States Government. 
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FOREWORD 
At the direction of the Secretary of the Air Force, Dr. James G. Roche, the Air Force 
Institute of Technology (AFIT) established a Center for Systems Engineering (CSE) at its 
Wright-Patterson AFB, OH, campus in 2002.  With academic oversight by a Subcommittee on 
Systems Engineering, chaired by Air Force Chief Scientist Dr. Alex Levis, the CSE was tasked 
to develop case studies focusing on the application of systems engineering principles within 
various aerospace programs.  At a May 2003 meeting, the Subcommittee reviewed several 
proposals and selected the Hubble Telescope (space system), Theater Battle Management Core 
System (complex software development), F-111 fighter (joint program with significant 
involvement by the Office of the Secretary of Defense), and C-5 cargo airlifter (very large, 
complex aircraft).  The committee drafted an initial case outline and learning objectives, and 
suggested the use of the Friedman-Sage Framework to guide overall analysis. 
The CSE contracted for management support with Universal Technology Corporation 
(UTC) in July 2003.  Principal investigators for the four cases included Mr. John Griffin for the  
C-5A, Dr. G. Keith Richey for the F-111, Mr. James Mattice for the Hubble Space Telescope, 
and Mr. Josh Collens from The MITRE Corporation for the Theater Battle Management Core 
System effort. 
The Department of Defense continues to develop and acquire joint complex systems that 
deliver needed capabilities demanded by our warfighters.  Systems engineering is the technical 
and technical management process that focuses explicitly on delivering and sustaining robust, 
high-quality, affordable products.  The Air Force leadership, from the Secretary of the Air Force, 
to our Service Acquisition Executive, through the Commander of Air Force Materiel Command, 
has collectively stated the need to mature a sound systems engineering process throughout the 
Air Force. 
These cases will support academic instruction on systems engineering within military 
service academies and at both civilian and military graduate schools.  Plans exist for future case 
studies focusing on other areas.  Suggestions have included various munitions programs, Joint 
service programs, logistics-led programs, science and technology/laboratory efforts, additional 
aircraft programs such as the B-2 bomber, and successful commercial systems. 
As we uncovered historical facts and conducted key interviews with program managers 
and chief engineers, both within the government and those working for the various prime and 
subcontractors, we concluded that systems programs face similar challenges today.  Applicable 
systems engineering principles and the effects of communication and the environment continue 
to challenge our ability to provide a balanced technical solution.  We look forward to your 
comments on this case study and the others that follow. 
 
 
 MARK K. WILSON, SES 
 Director, Center for Systems Engineering 
 Air Force Institute of Technology 
 http://cse.afit.edu/ 
iii 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
The author would like to acknowledge the special contributions of people who dedicated 
their time and energy to make this report accurate and complete.  My heartfelt thanks go to Eric 
Bucker, ASC/ENFS, for his efforts to research the files at the Engineering Directorate at Wright-
Patterson Air Force Base (WPAFB), his contribution to the weight section of the case study, his 
insightful suggestions, and his thorough editing.  Mr. Robert Ormsby, Lockheed (retired), was a 
key link to the contractor’s conduct of the program and provided insight of immense value.  He 
also sponsored me to attend the Retired Lockheed C-5A Luncheon and introduced me to some 
the wonderful people who designed and built the aircraft.  A special thank you to Mr. Les 
Smithers, who gave me insight into the process at the AF SPO and how the fatigue issue 
unfolded.  Mr. Tim Sweeney shared the AF SPO engineering conduct of the systems engineering 
process.  Sincere appreciation to all the people listed in Appendix 3, who volunteered their time 
and insight during the interviews.  Thanks to Dr. Dayne Aldridge for giving me the 
instructor/student view of the case study.  And special thanks to Lauren Proffit, Universal 
Technology Corporation, without whom I could never have finished the editing and formatting 
of the report.  Heartfelt congratulations to all the people involved in the program and particularly 
the systems engineers and design engineers at both Lockheed and WPAFB for their tireless 
efforts in delivering this truly outstanding capability that has served our nation so well for so 
many years. 
A special thank you and note of appreciation to our AFIT Project Leader, Lt Col John 
Colombi, who provided guidance to the authors, along with continuous motivation.  And the 
time spent reviewing and discussing the cases with the UTC authors, Jim Mattice (Hubble), and 
Keith Richey (F-111), was the true foundation for building our studies. 
  
 John M. Griffin 
 
iv 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
The C-5 Systems Engineering Case Study captures the untold story of the application of 
systems engineering during the concept exploration, development, and production of the USAF 
C-5A and C-5B aircraft.  The case study examines and dissects the systems engineering process 
as applied by the Air Force C-5 System Program Office and the prime contractor, Lockheed, 
Georgia, from the program’s genesis in 1957 to the last delivery of the C-5A and the beginning 
of the C-5B program in 1973.  Numerous interviews were conducted with the principals who 
managed and directed the program and a story of the systems engineering process was 
developed.  The case study traces the program’s systems engineering process in translating a 
vision into 125 cargo transport aircraft that have served our nation proudly for the last 35 years.  
A description of the program is essential to orient students to the size of the aircraft and 
the magnitude of the program and thus enable them to appreciate the systems engineering 
process and how it was applied.  When the C-5 aircraft first entered the inventory in 1970, it was 
the largest aircraft in the world, and it is still the largest transport cargo aircraft in our inventory.  
It was the first of the behemoths.  Figure 1 shows the dimensions of the aircraft and helps give a 
perspective of its size. 
 
Figure 1.  Three View Drawing of the C-5A Aircraft [1] 
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The success of the C-5 transport aircraft is underscored by the performance of the fleet as 
an operational system and its heavy lift support in all of our conflicts from Vietnam to Iraq.  It 
still accomplishes tasks that no other military aircraft, such as the new C-17 or any derivative of 
commercial cargo aircraft, can perform, and has consistently carried more cargo than any other 
aircraft in the time of war.  With a towering six-story “T” tail and a unique knight’s visor 
forward-loading door, this gigantic aircraft is capable of carrying two of the heaviest Army tanks 
and their related equipment, or three CH 47 Chinook helicopters.  The front and aft ramps 
facilitate easy drive-on, drive-off loading of military vehicles and equipment.   
The aircraft is capable of carrying heavy, outsized cargo in a cargo bay that measures 
19.5 feet wide by 13.5 feet high by 120 feet long.  The weight and performance of the aircraft is 
shown in Table 1.   
Table 1.  C-5A Weight and Performance Capabilities [1] 
 Weight Capability 
Design Weight 764,000 pounds (1) 
840,000 pounds (2) 
920,000 pounds (3) 
Max payload 265,000 pounds (4) 
Max fuel 335,000 pounds 
Max landing weight 635,850 pounds 
 Performance Capability 
Cruise performance 440 knots at 30,000 feet 
Airport performance 
Takeoff 
Landing 
 
8,000 feet at maximum gross weight 
4,000 feet with 100,000 pounds cargo 
(1) at 2.25 g 
(2) with the new wing 
(3) in flight limit after refueling 
(4) with the new wing 
The systems engineering process was essential to the development of the C-5.  The case 
study will describe the application of systems engineering from the initial phase of development 
and documentation of the system requirements, through the proposal phase, and during the 
design and development, testing, and production.  The study will detail the success of the 
systems engineering process to show an appreciation of the process used then and permit 
comparison as a benchmark against today’s processes.  Additionally, it will analyze the failures 
of the C-5A program that fueled the controversy surrounding the program during its 
development.  The role of systems engineering in the two most significant controversies – the 
cost overrun and the ineffective wing and pylon designs – will be presented.  The reader will be 
exposed to the decisions made and the decisions not made, and to the unintended consequences 
that arose from these events. 
The systems engineering process and its unique application to the C-5 program will be 
examined by developing four fundamental learning principles (LPs) from the program.  These 
learning principles will be analyzed, dissected, and discussed in detail to allow the reader to 
appreciate the circumstances surrounding the systems engineers, the program managers, and 
senior leadership.  These learning principles are the basic lessons that most graphically highlight 
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the core features or dominant factors that influence the outcome of the program.  For the C-5, 
they are: 
LP 1, Requirements.  The process for developing and documenting the system 
performance requirements integrated the User (warfighter), planners, developers, 
and technologists from both the government and industry in a coordinated set of 
trade studies.  It resulted in a well-balanced, well-understood set of requirements 
that fundamentally remained unchanged throughout the program. 
LP 2, Total Package Procurement Concept (TPPC).  The Total Package Procurement 
Concept (TPPC) employed by the government required a fixed-price, incentive 
fee contract for the design, development, and production of 58 aircraft.  It 
included a clause giving Total Systems Performance Responsibility (TSPR) to the 
prime contractor.  TPPC was invented to control costs, but it was the underlying 
cause of the cost overrun and limited the number of aircraft purchased under the 
original contract.   
LP 3, Weight Empty Guarantee.  A Weight Empty Guarantee was included in the 
specification as a performance requirement and in the contract as a cost penalty 
for overweight conditions of delivered aircraft.  The aircraft Weight Empty 
Guarantee dominated the traditional aircraft performance requirements (range, 
payload, etc.), increased costs, and resulted in a major shortfall in the wing and 
pylon fatigue life.  The stipulation of a Weight Empty Guarantee as a performance 
requirement had far-reaching and significantly deleterious unintended 
consequences. 
LP 4, Independent Review Teams (IRTs).  The Air Force C-5 Systems Program 
Office employed Independent Review Teams (IRTs) to assemble national experts 
to examine the program and provide recommendations to the government.  These 
problem-solving teams were convened to garner the best advice in particular 
technical areas:  structure design and technology, and designs to achieve useful 
service life. 
The development of the learning principles was an iterative and maturing process.  
Initially, a set of learning principles was postulated from the author’s experience and knowledge 
of the program.  As interviews were conducted with key people, the list of lessons was narrowed 
for the first draft.  The AFIT Systems Engineering Subcommittee reviewed the draft and the list 
evolved.  After the final list of learning principles was developed, the Friedman-Sage[2] 
assessment tool was used to examine the context of all the learning principles and their effect on 
the program.  The Friedman-Sage construct and its associated matrix of nine Concept Domains 
and Three Responsibility Domains gives the systems engineering practitioner a powerful tool to 
examine any program’s systems engineering progress and identify areas of risk.  A description of 
the tool, along with other key items that underpin the case study, will be found in the six 
appendices. 
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1.0 SYSTEMS ENGINEERING PRINCIPLES 
1.1 General Systems Engineering Process 
1.1.1 Introduction 
The Department of Defense continues to develop and acquire joint systems and to deliver 
needed capabilities to the warfighter.  With a constant objective to improve and mature the 
acquisition process, it continues to pursue new and creative methodologies to purchase these 
technically complex systems.  A sound systems engineering process, focused explicitly on 
delivering and sustaining robust, high-quality, affordable products that meet the needs of 
customers and stake holders must continue to evolve and mature.  Systems engineering is the 
technical and technical management process that results in delivered products and systems that 
exhibit the best balance of cost and performance.  The process must operate effectively with 
desired mission-level capabilities, establish system-level requirements, allocate these down to the 
lowest level of the design, and ensure validation and verification of performance, meeting cost 
and schedule constraints.  The systems engineering process changes as the program progresses 
from one phase to the next, as do the tools and procedures.  The process also changes over the 
decades, maturing, expanding, growing, and evolving from the base established during the 
conduct of past programs.  Systems engineering has a long history.  Examples can be found 
demonstrating a systemic application of effective engineering and engineering management, as 
well as poorly applied, but well defined processes.  Throughout the many decades during which 
systems engineering has emerged as a discipline, many practices, processes, heuristics, and tools 
have been developed, documented, and applied. 
Several core lifecycle stages have surfaced as consistently and continually challenging 
during any system program development.  First, system development must proceed from a well-
developed set of requirements.  Regardless of overall waterfall or evolutionary acquisition 
approach, the system requirements must flow down to all subsystems and lower level 
components.  System requirements need to be stable, balanced and must properly reflect all 
activities in all intended environments.  
Next, the system planning and analysis occur with important tradeoffs and a baseline 
architecture developed.  These architectural artifacts can depict any legacy system modifications, 
introduction of new technologies and overall system-level behavior and performance.  Modeling 
and simulation are generally employed to organize and assess alternatives at this introductory 
stage.  System and subsystem design follows the functional architecture.  Either newer object-
oriented analysis and design or classic structured analysis using functional decomposition and 
information flows/ data modeling occurs.  Design proceeds logically using key design reviews, 
tradeoff analysis, and prototyping to reduce any high-risk technology areas.   
Important to the efficient decomposition and creation of the functional and physical 
architectural designs are the management of interfaces and integration of subsystems.  This is 
applied to subsystems within a system, or across large, complex systems of systems.  Once a 
solution is planned, analyzed, designed and constructed, validation and verification take place to 
ensure satisfaction of requirements.  Definition of test criteria, measures of effectiveness (MOEs) 
and measures of performance (MOPs), established as part of the requirements process well 
before any component/ subsystem assembly, takes place. 
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There are several excellent representations of the systems engineering process presented 
in the literature.  These depictions present the current state of the art in the maturity and 
evolution of the systems engineering process.  One can find systems engineering process 
definitions, guides and handbooks from the International Council on Systems Engineering 
(INCOSE), European Industrial Association (EIA), Institute of Electrical and Electronics 
Engineers (IEEE), and various Department of Defense (DoD) agencies and organizations.  They 
show the process as it should be applied by today’s experienced practitioner.  One of these 
processes, long used by the Defense Acquisition University (DAU), is depicted by Figure 1-1.  It 
should be noted that this model is not accomplished in a single pass.  Alternatively, it is an 
iterative and nested process that gets repeated at low and lower levels of definition and design. 
 
Figure 1-1.  The Systems Engineering Process as Presented by the 
Defense Acquisition University 
1.1.2 Evolving Systems Engineering Process 
The DAU model, like all others, has been documented in the last two decades, and has 
expanded and developed to reflect a changing environment.  Systems are becoming increasingly 
complex internally and more interconnected externally.  The process used to develop the aircraft 
and systems of the past was a process effective at the time.  It served the needs of the 
practitioners and resulted in many successful systems in our inventory.  Notwithstanding, the 
cost and schedule performance of the past programs are fraught with examples of some well-
managed programs and ones with less stellar execution.  As the nation entered the 1980s and 
1990s, large DoD and commercial acquisitions were overrunning costs and behind schedule.  
The aerospace industry and its organizations were becoming larger and were more 
2 
geographically and culturally distributed.  The systems engineering process, as applied within the 
confines of a single system and a single company, is no longer the norm. 
Today, many factors overshadow new acquisition, including system-of-systems (SoS) 
context, network centric warfare and operations, and the rapid growth in information technology.  
These factors have driven a new form of emergent systems engineering, which focuses on certain 
aspects of our current process.  One of these increased areas of focus resides in the architectural 
definitions used during system analysis.  This process will be differentiated by greater reliance 
on reusable, architectural views describing the system context and concept of operations, 
interoperability, information and data flows and network service-oriented characteristics.  The 
DoD has recently made these architectural products, described in the DoD Architectural 
Framework (DoDAF), mandatory to enforce this new architecture-driven systems engineering 
process throughout the acquisition lifecycle.   
1.1.3 Case Studies 
The systems engineering process to be used in today’s complex system-of-systems 
projects is a process matured and founded on the principles of systems developed in the past.  
The examples of systems engineering used on other programs, both past and present, provide a 
wealth of lessons to be used in applying and understanding today’s process.  It was this thinking 
that led to the construction of the four case studies released in this series. 
The purpose of developing detailed case studies is to support the teaching of systems 
engineering principles.  They will facilitate learning by emphasizing to the student the long-term 
consequences of the systems engineering and programmatic decisions on program success.  The 
systems engineering case studies will assist in discussion of both successful and unsuccessful 
methodologies, processes, principles, tools, and decision material to assess the outcome of 
alternatives at the program/system level.  In addition, the importance of using skills from 
multiple professions and engineering disciplines and collecting, assessing, and integrating varied 
functional data will be emphasized.  When they are taken together, the student is provided real-
world, detailed examples of how the process attempts to balance cost, schedule and performance.   
The utilization and mis-utilization of systems engineering learning principles will be 
highlighted, with special emphasis on the conditions that foster and impede good systems 
engineering practice.  Case studies should be used to illustrate both good and bad examples of 
acquisition management and learning principles, to include whether: 
• Every system provides a balanced and optimized product to a customer 
• Effective Requirements analysis was applied 
• Consistent and rigorous application of systems engineering Management standards 
was applied 
• Effective Test planning was accomplished 
• There were effective major Technical program reviews 
• Continuous Risk assessments and management was implemented 
• There were reliable Cost estimates and policies 
• They used disciplined application of Configuration Management 
• A well defined System boundary was defined 
• They used disciplined methodologies for complex systems  
• Problem solving incorporated understanding of the System within bigger environment 
(customer’s customer) 
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The systems engineering process transforms an operational need into a set of system 
elements.  These system elements are allocated and translated by the systems engineering 
process into detailed requirements.  The systems engineering process, from the identification of 
the need to the development and utilization of the product, must continuously integrate and 
balance the requirements, cost, and schedule to provide an operationally effective system 
throughout its life cycle.  Case studies should also highlight the various interfaces and 
communications to achieve this optimization, which include: 
• The program manager/systems engineering interface essential between the 
operational user and developer (acquirer) to translate the needs into the performance 
requirements for the system and subsystems. 
• The government/contractor interface essential for the practice of systems engineering 
to translate and allocate the performance requirements into detailed requirements. 
• The developer (acquirer)/User interface within the project, essential for the systems 
engineering practice of integration and balance. 
The systems engineering process must manage risk, both known and unknown, as well as 
both internal and external.  This objective will specifically capture those external factors and the 
impact of these uncontrollable influences, such as actions of Congress, changes in funding, new 
instructions/policies, changing stakeholders or user requirements or contractor and government 
staffing levels. 
Lastly, the systems engineering process must respond to “Mega-Trends” in the systems 
engineering discipline itself, as the nature of systems engineering and related practices do vary 
with time. 
1.1.4 Framework for Analysis 
The case studies will be presented in a format that follows the learning principles 
specifically derived for the program, but will utilize the Friedman-Sage framework to organize 
the assessment of the application of the systems engineering process.  The framework and the 
derived matrix can play an important role in developing case studies in systems engineering and 
systems management, especially case studies that involve systems acquisition.  The framework 
presents a nine row by three column matrix shown in Table 1-1.   
Table 1-1.  A Framework of Key Systems Engineering Concepts and Responsibilities 
Concept Domain Responsibility Domain 
 1.  Contractor 
Responsibility 
2.  Shared 
Responsibility 
3.  Government 
Responsibility 
A. Requirements Definition and 
Management 
   
B. Systems Architecting and 
Conceptual Design 
   
C. System and Subsystem Detailed 
Design and Implementation 
   
D. Systems and Interface Integration    
E. Validation and Verification    
F. Deployment and Post Deployment    
G. Life Cycle Support    
H. Risk Assessment and Management     
I. System and Program Management    
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Six of the nine concept domain areas in Table 1-1 represent phases in the systems 
engineering lifecycle: 
A. Requirements Definition and Management 
B. Systems Architecting and Conceptual Design 
C. Detailed System and Subsystem Design and Implementation 
D. Systems and Interface Integration 
E. Validation and Verification 
F. System Deployment and Post Deployment 
Three of the nine concept areas represent necessary process and systems management 
support: 
G. Life Cycle Support 
H. Risk management 
I. System and Program Management 
While other concepts could be have been identified, the Framework suggests these nine 
are the most relevant to systems engineering in that they cover the essential life cycle processes 
in systems acquisition and the systems management support in the conduct of the process.  Most 
other concept areas that were identified during the development of the matrix appear to be 
subsets of one of these.  The three columns of this two-dimensional framework represent the 
responsibilities and perspectives of government and contractor, and the shared responsibilities 
between the government and the contractor.     
The important feature of the Friedman-Sage framework is the matrix.  The systems 
engineering case studies published by AFIT employ the Friedman-Sage construct and matrix as 
the baseline assessment tools to evaluate the conduct of the systems engineering process for the 
topic program.  The Friedman Sage matrix is not a unique systems engineering applications tool 
per se, but rather a disciplined approach to evaluate the systems engineering process, tools, and 
procedures as applied to a program.   
The Friedman-Sage matrix is based on two major premises as the founding objectives: 
• In teaching systems engineering, case studies can be instructive in that they relate 
aspects of the real world to the student to provide valuable program experience and 
professional practice to academic theory.   
In teaching systems engineering in DoD, there has previously been a little distinction 
between duties and responsibilities of the government and industry activities.  More often than 
not, the government role in systems engineering is the role as the requirements developer.   
1.2 C-5A Learning Principles 
The programs of the past can provide today’s systems engineering practitioners with 
valuable insight into the methods used by our predecessors in developing our heritage aircraft.  
The success of these systems can be traced to the systems engineering process, which, while 
different from the processes of today, resemble them in many ways.  The C-5A fleet has 
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demonstrated success in operation, but, as will be discussed, the development of the aircraft was 
plagued by a major technical failure in the design of the structure, most notably the wing and 
pylon.  The fatigue or service life led to initial operational restrictions and required a complete 
new wing to be designed and retrofitted to the original aircraft.  The program’s cost overrun was 
also a major contentious issue starting in 1966 and lasting for the life of the program.  The 
application of the systems engineering process and its role in the program successes and failures 
will be traced from concept exploration to the delivery of the 81st C-5A model in May 1973.   
The C-5 learning principles are: 
LP 1, Requirements.  The process for developing and documenting the system 
performance requirements integrated the User (warfighter), planners, developers, 
and technologists from both the government and industry in a coordinated set of 
trade studies.  It resulted in a well-balanced, well-understood set of requirements 
that fundamentally remained unchanged throughout the program. 
LP 2, Total Package Procurement Concept (TPPC).  The Total Package Procurement 
Concept (TPPC) employed by the government required a fixed-price, incentive 
fee contract for the design, development, and production of 58 aircraft.  It 
included a clause giving Total Systems Performance Responsibility (TSPR) to the 
prime contractor.  TPPC was invented to control costs, but it was the underlying 
cause of the cost overrun and limited the number of aircraft purchased under the 
original contract.   
LP 3, Weight Empty Guarantee.  A Weight Empty Guarantee was included in the 
specification as a performance requirement and in the contract as a cost penalty 
for overweight conditions of delivered aircraft.  The aircraft Weight Empty 
Guarantee dominated the traditional aircraft performance requirements (range, 
payload, etc.), increased costs, and resulted in a major shortfall in the wing and 
pylon fatigue life.  The stipulation of a Weight Empty Guarantee as a performance 
requirement had far-reaching and significantly deleterious unintended 
consequences. 
LP 4, Independent Review Teams (IRTs).  The Air Force C-5 Systems Program 
Office employed Independent Review Teams (IRTs) to assemble national experts 
to examine the program and provide recommendations to the government.  These 
problem-solving teams were convened to garner the best advice in particular 
technical areas:  structure design and technology, and designs to achieve useful 
service life. 
1.2.1 C-5A Friedman Sage Matrix 
Table 1-2 shows the Friedman-Sage matrix for the C-5 and the four entries in the matrix 
most representative of the four learning principles.  C-5 Learning Principle 1, Requirements, is 
clearly represented by the first row of the concept domain, Requirements Definition and 
Management.  The case study will follow the systems engineering process used to define the 
requirements and document them in the system specification, as well as the contractor’s process 
for allocating the functional requirements to the design requirements.  While at the beginning of 
the requirements process the bulk of the responsibility lies with the customer, the responsibility 
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for requirements definition shared between the contractor and the government is also a vital part 
of the process.   
C-5 Learning Principle 2, Total Package Procurement Concept (TPPC), falls primarily at 
the intersection of system and program management and into the government’s responsibility, 
but, again, this decision process spans all three responsibility domains.  While it was the 
government’s responsibility to select the contract type, there is implied responsibility on the part 
of the contractor to assess the risk in accomplishing the contract and a shared responsibility to 
derive the pros and cons of contemplated contract strategies.  This proved particularly significant 
for the C-5, as will be shown.  The contract type stipulated by TPPC also affected the system 
design of the third row, first column, which is primarily a contractor responsibility.   
C-5 Learning Principle 3, Weight Empty Guarantee, heavily influenced the systems 
engineering process and is representative of a contractor responsibility (third row, first column).  
It also dominated the Validation and Verification row, particularly the shared responsibility, 
because of the negative impact of weight and its impact on reduced service life, all of which was 
discovered during full scale testing late in the program cycle.   
C-5 Learning Principle 4, Independent Review Teams (IRTs) employed by the Air Force 
SPO was dominant in the Validation and Verification row, middle column, shared responsibility 
only because of the specific of use of IRTs for the C-5.  The use of IRTs is a vital function of 
SPOs in general and therefore would usually be noted as a Systems and Program Management 
function of the Friedman Sage matrix.  It will be highlighted in both the locations of the matrix 
for the C-5 because the SPO convened IRTs to solve a specific problem that applied to 
Validation and Verification of the new wing design.  The entry in the matrix under the shared 
responsibility reflects that the team was populated by national experts and also by members of 
the contractor’s design team and personnel from the Air Force SPO.   
Table 1-2.  Friedman Sage Matrix with C-5 Learning Principles [2] 
Concept Domain Responsibility Domain 
 1. SE Contractor 
Responsibility 
2. Shared Responsibility 3. Government 
Responsibility 
A. Requirements Definition and Management   LP 1 
Requirements 
B. Systems Architecting and Conceptual 
Design 
   
C. System and Subsystem Detailed Design 
and Implementation 
LP 3, Weight Empty 
Guarantee 
  
D. Systems and Interface Integration    
E. Validation and Verification  LP 4 Independent Review 
Teams 
 
F. Deployment and Post Deployment    
G. Life Cycle Support    
H. Risk Assessment and Management     
I. System and Program Management  LP 4 Independent Review 
Teams 
LP 2, TPPC 
As noted, the three columns of this two-dimensional concept framework represent the 
responsibility domain and perspectives of the government and the contractor, respectively, and 
responsibilities shared by the government and the contractor.  The complete systems engineering 
process for the C-5A program is shown in matrix form in Appendix 1 to illustrate the application 
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of the framework and matrix for this case study.  The four learning principles and the highlighted 
boxes of the matrix will organize the data and discussion in the body of this case study.   
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2.0 SYSTEM DESCRIPTION 
The C-5A cargo aircraft was conceived in the early 1950s by senior leadership in the U.S. 
Air Force and the Military Air Transport Service (MATS).  It was becoming increasingly clear 
that the nation would be engaged in conflicts arising in distant locations, and senior military 
planners contemplated methods to employ forces that could quickly stop an advancing enemy.  
They envisioned a very large cargo/transport aircraft capable of carrying the heaviest of the 
Army M-60 tanks, large bulky cargo such as the Chinook CH-47 helicopter, and other heavy 
Army equipment for extremely long distances.  The aircraft was to be part of a family of jet 
engine-powered platforms that would transport an entire Army division to the war front.  Figure 
2-1 shows the vehicle three-view. 
 
 
Figure 2-1.  C-5 Three-View [1] 
9 
Table 2-1 shows the performance characteristics of the aircraft.   
Table 2-1.  C-5A Weight and Performance Capabilities 
 Weight Capability 
Design Weight 764,000 pounds (1) 
840,000 pounds (2) 
920,000 pounds (3) 
Max payload 265,000 pounds (4) 
Max fuel 335,000 pounds 
Max landing weight 635,850 pounds 
 Performance Capability 
Cruise performance 440 knots at 30,000 feet 
Airport performance 
Takeoff 
Landing 
 
8,000 feet at maximum gross weight 
4,000 feet with 100,000 pounds cargo 
(1) at 2.25 g 
(2) with the new wing 
(3) in flight limit after refueling 
(4) with the new wing 
 
2.1 Cargo Loading Features 
The aft cargo bay doors and the forward knight’s visor nose allow for drive-on and drive-
off loading capabilities.  Additionally, the fore and aft sections of the aircraft have loading ramps 
that can be positioned to truck bed height.  A further complementary feature that facilitates ease 
of cargo loading is the unique kneeling landing gear, which can position the aircraft height from 
the normal taxi height of 113 inches down to 79 inches above the ground.  The aft cargo doors 
can also be opened in flight for airdrop missions, allowing aerial delivery of pallets weighing up 
to 50,000 pounds.  The aft paratrooper doors are located on each side of the cargo compartment.  
The C-5A with landing gear set at its lowest level, raised visor, and opened aft ramp doors is 
shown in Figure 2-2. 
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 Figure 2-2.  C-5A Loading and Unloading Equipment 
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3.0 C-5 SYSTEMS ENGINEERING LEARNING PRINCIPLES 
Table 3-1 shows the key events of the time frame covered by the case study for the C-5 
program.  The C-5A and C-5B continue today as active inventory aircraft and are even funded 
for modernization.  Two programs, Avionics Modernization Program (AMP) and Reliability 
Enhancement Re-Engine Program (RERP), are ongoing and summarized in Appendix 6.   
Table 3-1.  Key C-5 Milestones 
Concept Exploration 1957–1963 LP 1, Requirements 
 Mission Effectiveness/Operational Anal  1957–1963 
 Contractor Teams Assembled  1961–1963 
 TPPC Evolution  1963–1965 LP 2, TPPC 
 AF SPO Cadre Established  1964 
Systems Design and Dev’t 1964–1972 
 Contractor Conceptual Design Trades  1961–1964 
 RFP Release  Dec 1964 
 Contractor submits proposal  20 April 1965 
 Contractor Proposal Evaluation by AF  April 1965-Sept 1965 LP 3, Weight empty 
 Contractor Initial Debriefs  Sept 1965 
 Lockheed Announced as C-5 Winner  Sept 1965 
 Weight Growth/Drag Increase  Dec 1965-Jan 1967 
 SPO Cure Notice  Feb 1967 
 First SPO IRT  1967 LP 4, Independent Review Teams 
 First Fatigue Test Results  June 1968–Dec 1972 
 First Flight  28 June 1968 
 Defense Advisory Group  1969 
 ASC IRT  1969–1971 
 Flight Restrictions on C-5A  1969–1987 
Production of C-5A 19671973 
 Last (81st) C-5A Delivered  May 1973 
Initial Operational Capability June 1970 
New Wing Design start Jan 1976 
First C-5A Wing Modification June 1981 
First C-5B Delivered Sept 1985 
Last C-5A Wing Modification May 1987 
The learning principles are shown in shorthand notation in the table to show when they 
first surfaced.  This table will be a handy reference to the reader during the discussions of the 
learning principles in the text in Sections 3.2 through 3.5 to keep dates and events in the proper 
chronological order.   
Lockheed Management Process 
The technical and management staff on the C-5A program at Lockheed involved 
themselves in the systems engineering and system integration process on a daily basis.  
Lockheed managed interfaces were managed within the company using interface control 
documents and subcontractor interfaces using interface control drawings developed through joint 
working groups.  The two primary management techniques were (1) an informal process 
perfected over the years by the professional staff, who had developed two operational aircraft 
together, and (2) a formal process managed by the chief engineer and the program manager.   
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The formal process worked exceptionally well.  Every Wednesday, at the 7:00 a.m. chief 
engineer’s meeting, each aspect of the design, integration, schedule, and systems engineering 
process was reviewed.  It was imperative that the principal who presented the information be 
prepared and that there be no open actions with unresolved closure plans. 
One particularly illustrative anecdote involved a schedule review.  The schedule manager 
presented a list of over 500 tasks that were to be accomplished that week.  The manager reported 
that all items were on track except for some small number of items.  Of the late items, most had 
been resolved and there was a plan to finish the work and get back on schedule.  For those 
unresolved items for which there was no current work-around, the names of the engineers 
responsible for correcting these problems were shown.  On Thursday, the chief engineer visited 
the desks of the engineers and all the problems had been resolved! [1, 5 (numerous interviews)]. 
The Lockheed systems engineering process was fundamental to the functioning of the 
design team.  In the 1950s and 1960s, it was commonplace for a design team to stay relatively 
intact within a company.  The C-5A design engineers had worked together for years at the 
Lockheed facility at Marietta, Georgia, and knew each other well.  The core design team, 
especially the senior subsystem engineers, grew up using the Marietta division’s internal 
procedures and were mentored by those who perfected the processes.  The team had experience 
on numerous developments and knew each other’s strengths and weakness.  Coordination and 
integration formed part of the basic design process, so procedures were followed automatically.1 
Thus, the Lockheed process had formal procedures, tools, and processes that were well defined, 
completely documented, and taught to all the team members; although their number and extent 
were less than those of today’s systems engineering baseline.  The informal systemic process 
used by the engineering, production, and management teams for the C-5A pervaded the industry 
teams and, therefore, integration was part of the basic work pattern.   
The Air Force contract with Lockheed required the use of a PERT-TIME format to 
control the schedule [1].  This was the premier scheduling tool available at the time, but the 
systems engineering process within Lockheed required a much more detailed schedule 
methodology to track the many thousands of design and manufacturing details.  Lockheed’s 
scheduling system carried over 200,000 events, yet allowed flexibility in rescheduling items 
under individual control.  When two groups negotiated a change to the schedule, the schedule 
monitors were so advised and entered the new schedule into the computer program, which was 
then made available to the engineers and managers.  
Risk Assessment and Management  
The risk management process used by Lockheed during the development phase was a 
subset of the systems engineering process and was conducted exceptionally well using the 
inherent workings of the systems engineering and design process systemic to the design teams 
resident at Lockheed Marietta.  Systems engineering sub-processes, such as technical 
performance measurement and tracking, earned value, PERT-TIME schedule, etc., were 
conducted on a daily basis through the established relationships between and among the 
professional staff who had worked together on previous programs, such as the C-130 and C-141. 
                                                 
1 Today, it is rare to find an experienced, complete company team that has performed three to five designs.  
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Each of the design groups was assigned the responsibility to identify risks, develop risk 
mitigation plans, and ensure that technical disciplines that would be affected by, or could affect, 
the risk, were included in the risk solutions.  This responsibility included logistics, 
manufacturing, and operations.  The chief engineer and all those who reported directly to him 
reviewed risks at the weekly chief engineer’s staff meeting.  The Wednesday morning meeting 
was the forum for presenting risk, reviewing the mitigation plan, and providing guidance, 
corrective action, and approval from the collective staff.  These meetings were extremely 
important and the principals seldom missed them. 
The program manager meeting was also held weekly.  Everyone who reported directly  to 
the program attended this meeting, which featured the same review process and discipline used 
in the chief engineer’s meeting.  The program manager was also shown the results of the systems 
engineering process and tracking of technical performance measures as a metric for progress of 
the design team.   
The government System Program Office (SPO) delegated the risk identification and 
mitigation process to its engineers, manufacturing personnel, logisticians, and other professional 
disciplines.  The staff within the SPO could review, monitor, and track the contractor’s progress 
and assess the contractor’s ability to meet the specification requirements.  The procedure 
involved advising program management of the SPO’s assessment of risk. 
Flight Testing 
The first flight of the C-5A occurred on 28 June 1968, 33 months after contract award, 
and initiated an era of flight testing with the Air Force and contractor operating as a combined 
flight test unit.  The lesson in systems engineering, however, derives as much from the 
preparation for flight testing as from the actual conduct of the flight testing.  Lockheed assigned 
Mr. David Dickenson at the Marietta facility to oversee flight testing [5].  He immediately 
configured a flight test team from the company that included representatives from all of the 
relevant disciplines:  engineering, configuration management, ground testing, manufacturing, 
and flight operations.  This multifaceted, multidisciplinary team was able to conduct all ground 
testing prior to the actual flight test using experienced people, all of whom played a key role in 
their respective technical disciplines throughout the design and production of the aircraft. 
During the early engine runs, a special test facility was constructed at the contractor’s 
facility and was staffed by both Lockheed and General Electric (GE) personnel.  This facilitated 
early testing and troubleshooting and was instrumental in achieving a mature design for the 
engine prior to first flight.  The ground vibration tests were also accomplished at the Marietta 
facility, with many of the engineers who designed the structure assisting in test setup and data 
reduction. 
3.1 C-5 Learning Principle 1:  Requirements 
The first, and arguably most important, phase of the systems engineering process used in 
the C-5A program defined and documented the system requirements.  Achieving a balance 
between the required operational performance and the design risk, within the associated cost and 
the stipulated schedule, was a major accomplishment.  The process will be discussed so that the 
student can evaluate the methods used and the soundness of the approach compared to more 
modern applications of the requirements process.   
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Requirements Definition and Management 
Requirements definition for the C-5A was a complete process in that it included all the 
necessary participants and integrated their inputs.  It employed the systems engineering tools for 
mission effectiveness/operational analysis available at the time – the forerunners of today’s 
modeling and simulation tools.  Starting with the statement of the top-level functional goal, 
“move an Army division from CONUS to a distant location,” the project team developed the 
lower level functional requirements.  Drawing on the combined and integrated experience of the 
government users, operators, engineers, development planners, and technologists, as well as on 
the engineering design, conceptual analysis, and manufacturing capability of the aerospace 
industry, the systems engineering process balanced the user’s needs with current design 
capability.  The organizations cooperated, exchanged data,  and debated alternatives, 
continuously narrowing the choices and communicating the evolving baseline to all team 
members [5 (Lusczek, Dvorscak)].   
Communications 
The C-5 systems engineering requirements process was designed to incorporate 
communication in all directions:  upward to the systems management team, across to ensure 
integration of the user’s needs during design and integration among the technical disciplines, and 
down to allocate requirements to the designers.  The methods used to communicate requirements 
and issues among the operational user, the SPO, and Lockheed provide an excellent heuristic for 
predicting success.  This phase of the systems engineering process culminated in a balanced, 
achievable, and integrated set of requirements that were fully understood by all parties, and that 
remained stable throughout the development of the aircraft.  The C-5A program accomplished 
this task in a textbook manner.  The organizations involved in requirements derivation are 
graphically depicted in Figure 3-1.   
Communication 1961-1963
Industry
Boeing
Douglas
Lockheed
Army
Needs
Air Force
Research
Laboratories
MATS
Operational Systems
C-133
C-124
C-130
C-119
C-141
AFSC/ASC
Program
Management
Initial SPO
Cadre
Influences
Vietnam
Century Series Fighter Cost
Military/Industrial Complex
F-111 Program
ASC
Development
Planning
HQ AF
Secretary
AF/I&L
DoD
McNamara
Congress
Figure 3-1.  Operational Mission Analysis and Communications 
During Concept Exploration 
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The overlapping circles in Figure 3-1 are very important because they depict the 
hierarchy in the systems engineering leadership.  This changed with time.  For the concept 
exploration phase and during the mission effectiveness/operational analysis, the development 
planning organization  led the process.  During the design and development phase, the Air Force 
SPO was the dominant organization, but it led only the processes for which it was primarily 
responsible, while Lockheed served as lead for the contractor’s primary processes.  This 
underscores the importance of using the Friedman-Sage matrix to sort and define responsibilities 
as well as tasks.  It is vital to understanding the organizational communications process for any 
program at the various phases.   
The Air Research and Development Center (ARDC) – the forerunner organization of the 
Deputy for Development Planning at the Aeronautical Systems Center (ASC) at Wright-
Patterson Air Force Base (WPAFB) – solicited and integrated the inputs from the stakeholders of 
the other organizations.  External influences from two sources were integrated into the trade 
study process.  The first of the external factors is indicated by the group of three entities depicted 
on the left side of Figure 3-1, all of which interacted with each other as indicated by the curved 
arrows.  This group was instrumental because it influenced the Air Force leadership, which in 
turn provided program direction, as depicted by the arrow from the AF Secretary’s office to Air 
Force Systems Command (AFSC).  The second set of external influences came from the national 
and worldwide situations that existed at the time. 
The communication between and among all the people in the stakeholder organizations 
on the right-hand side of the figure was excellent from the beginning of the program [5 (Ormsby, 
Goldfarb)].  This cooperative working relationship and an environment of open sharing persisted 
throughout all levels of the program, even during the height of the controversies over cost and 
weight.  
Operational Effectiveness/Mission Analysis 
Operational effectiveness/mission analysis studies represented the first steps in the 
systems engineering requirements process [3,4].  The purpose of this phase of the process was to 
develop a balanced set of achievable requirements, well within the current reach of state-of-the-
art technology.  The systems engineering process assessed the User’s needs, determined whether 
the available technology was sufficiently mature to produce a practical design, evaluated the 
prime contractor’s engineering/manufacturing capabilities, and performed operational mission 
effectiveness assessments. 
Operational effectiveness/mission analysis studies covered range, payload, speed, and 
airport conditions, both at takeoff and landing.  The entire cargo/transport aircraft community, 
the contractors, the development planners, the users, and the technologists were deeply involved 
in the assessment process.  It resulted in the publication of the MATS Qualitative Operational 
Requirements (QOR) in October 1961 [1] and the System Operational Requirements (SOR) 214 
for Heavy Lift Logistics Weapon System on 25 March 1964, and the release of the RFP in 
December 1965.  Note that the whole process took seven years, starting with the early vision, to 
build the program consensus, develop the budget plan, and define the requirements. 
The operational mission analysis was conducted under the direction of the major 
command, Air Material Command (AMC).  Under AMC, the Air Research and Development 
Command (ARDC) was organized to include the Wright Air Development Center (WADC), 
which was responsible for all research and development procurement, including weapon 
16 
systems.  WADC included a Plans office under the direction of Mr. Fred D. Orazio, Sr. [3].  The 
Air Force organizational structure that existed prior to the Packard Commission of the early 
1980s and the Goldwater–Nichols Act of 1986 assigned responsibility for development planning 
for air systems within WADC (later Aeronautical Systems Division from April 1961 to July 
1992, and Aeronautical Systems Center from July 1992 to the present).  Led by WADC from 
1956 to 1959, the Deputy for Development Planning initiated design studies and operational 
analysis to develop a range of vehicle sizes and missions various sized aircraft could accomplish.   
WADC assessed the state of the art of technology relative to the top functional 
requirement of moving an Army division and their heavy equipment to a distant location.  At one 
end of the spectrum was the current air transport fleet and the Navy ships.  The maximum 
requirement at the other extreme would be to move the division in one trip halfway around the 
world.  The initial studies examined the Air Force fleet size and the rather simple task of 
managing the receiving airport with the influx of Air Force airplanes and Army equipment.  The 
second task was to study the locations of potential conflicts and the nation’s ability to operate 
from bases close to those locations. 
Given the worldwide operating capacity of the United States, the maximum distance to 
move the Army division was estimated at 10,000 nautical miles.  This could be done in one trip 
of 10,000 miles by the transport fleet, with the attendant implications for the aircraft size to fly 
that far unrefueled, or within some number of refuelings.  The trade studies eventually concluded 
that one refueling would be the most cost-effective solution.  The requirement was then levied 
for both air refueling and a mid-mission landing/refuel/takeoff from an austere location.  This 
latter requirement was a major driver for the design of the leading-edge and trailing-edge lift 
system and caused Lockheed to spend a greater number of engineering hours than initially bid to 
optimize the lift characteristics of the aircraft.   
Derived Functional Requirements 
The next step in developing derived architectural functions was planning for the 
environment at the landing site.  The operational experience of both MATS and the Army 
dictated delivery of the equipment in close proximity to the front.  The derived requirement to 
operate at an austere forward location with an unimproved runway drove a requirement to 
operate on a surface with a California Bearing Ratio (CBR) of 92 [1].  This produced a derived 
requirement for a high flotation landing gear configuration and defined the number, type, and 
size of the tires and wheels.  The forward location also required anytime operation, which in turn 
demanded operation in high crosswinds, assessed as 35 kts.  This, in turn, derived a need for 
crosswind gear capability, so the design incorporated landing gear bogies that could slue into the 
wind.  Since the austere location would have little or no support equipment, the landing gear was 
complicated even more by incorporating a kneeling function to facilitate loading and unloading.  
Systems engineering accurately highlighted the cost, weight, and risk to the landing gear design, 
but despite this the User opted for the added complexity.  Figure 3-2 shows the C-5A in its 
landing configuration as the aircraft would approach an unprepared field.   
                                                 
2 The advertising brochures colloquially referred to this as the equivalent of a major league outfield surface 
for the landing strip. 
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 Figure 3-2.  C-5A Landing Gear Configuration 
It should be noted that by the time the C-5B was designed in the late 1970s the user 
realized that operating this precious asset on unprepared runways near the warfront was neither 
prudent nor necessary, and the landing gear was somewhat simplified by removing the crosswind 
feature.  This reflected a change of operational philosophy with time and experience more than a 
change from the original requirements.  It was not cost effective to delete any of the other gear 
functions, but certainly by the time the C-5B was built the high flotation requirement for the 
landing gear would have been judged unnecessary.  Had this been deleted from the original C-5A 
requirements list, it would have resulted in a far simpler and lighter landing gear configuration.   
During the early operational mission analysis studies, the team assessed the feasibility of 
very large aircraft with takeoff weights as high as 3 million pounds.  The purpose of studying 
large aircraft was to assess the technology required to design and build such vehicles and to 
assess the practicality of operating them in the real world [3, 5 (Lusczek)].  The study outcome 
narrowed the range of the aircraft weight to between 650,000 and 750,000 pounds, a large 
increase over the state of the art, but not a quantum leap over vehicles in the inventory or in 
development during the mid-1960s.   
The Army established a desired range of vehicles and equipment to be transported, which 
included the largest tanks, fighting vehicles, and trucks in their inventory.  This drove the 
requirement to accommodate outsized cargo, which became the basis for the C-5.  A requirement 
for aerial delivery of both goods and paratroopers was stipulated, as was drive-on, drive-off 
cargo capability at both loading and unloading airport locations.   
MATS, the operators of the planned system, had significant experience with the current 
strategic airlifter, the C-133.  During the early requirements phase, MATS developed the 
performance requirements necessary at both takeoff and landing airports.  The cruise 
performance and range were driven in large part by the ability of the C-141 to attain high cruise 
speeds for MATS missions.  
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Industry Involvement 
The aerospace industry was involved in the early studies by providing assessments of 
conceptual designs and the technology readiness levels of the system and subsystems.  By 1961, 
it was clear that the Air Force was committed to the C-X HLS – Cargo-Experimental, Heavy Lift 
System, as it was originally known.  The Air Force and MATS had released the QOR in October 
1961 and industry competitors started assembling teams to develop their concepts and prepare 
for the eventual competition to design and build the system.  The three leaders in the 
competition, Boeing, Douglas, and Lockheed, conducted numerous conceptual design trade 
studies from 1961 to 1963.  Lockheed, under the leadership of Robert Ormsby, performed 
configuration assessments to see if a new and innovative configuration could be derived that 
would provide a cost advantage and even capture the imagination of the customer (see Appendix 
5 for a summary of the early systems engineering trade studies) [9].  Lockheed revisited and 
reviewed the configuration studies they had performed during the early C-141 assessment and 
found that the swept wing, “T” tail configuration remained the best overall approach to satisfy 
the requirements that were coalescing from the operational mission analysis. 
System Architecture Development 
The C-5A system architecture resulted directly from the requirements process.  As 
previously noted, the top-level functional architecture statement was to move an Army division 
to the point of a conventional conflict in a distant country.  The architecture tree of functional 
needs was derived from that need.  The operational mission analysis continuously expanded the 
requirements tree until a complete set of system functions, down to the lowest level, was 
developed and documented.  The features needed by the program were then made part of the 
requirements and stipulated in the contractually required weapon system specification and the 
subsystems specifications. 
The weapon system specification and the subsystems specifications subsumed the 
Military Specifications in effect at the time.  The flying qualities were required per Mil F-8785.  
The Mil Specs were modified as the mission dictated and incorporated in the specification tree.  
For example, Mil F-8785 was augmented as a result of extensive ground-based, pilot-in-the-loop 
simulator testing and pilot assessments of the responsiveness of such large, high-inertia vehicles.  
One particularly difficult requirement in the original specification was to achieve a roll angle of 
eight degrees in one second on powered approach.  Flight simulations and flight test verification 
in a C-135 showed that the aircraft would not need to achieve this angle to correct for navigation 
errors after flying 5,500 nautical miles, breaking out from a 500-foot ceiling, and correcting the 
flight path back to the runway.  The specification was amended to include a more realistic and 
perfectly adequate value of 5 degrees in the first second [5 (Sweeney, Ormsby)].   
The contractor was required to show how they would implement the progressively 
allocated functional requirements in a design.  The government systems engineering process 
tracked the ability of a design to meet the allocated functional baseline.   
The Air Force mandated the use of the new AFSCM 375 manuals [7], volumes one 
through five, for the C-5A.  The manuals stipulated features, processes, tools, and procedures 
that the contractor was required to employ during the design, development, and production of the 
system.  These requirements and mandates as to how to manage the program had a large cost 
impact on the contractor, as the stipulations of the AFSCMs had to be addressed by specific 
management actions. 
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Requirements Management:  SPO and Contractor 
While Lockheed and the SPO used different systems engineering processes, they did 
work together, because there was still only one weapon system that both processes acted upon.  
The systems engineering process used by the SPO had the fundamental purpose of assessing how 
changes in the requirements stipulated in the contractual baseline affected the design.  The 
systems engineering process operating within Lockheed’s design teams allocated the contractual 
requirements of the system specification to the lowest level of the design.  It was vital that the 
process transmit the impact on the system to the entire design team from top to bottom, including 
the subcontractors.  Another essential feature of the process ensured horizontal, as well as a 
vertical, allocation of the functional requirements.  If a conflict could not be resolved within the 
design, the prime contractor’s systems engineering process had a mechanism to refer the conflict 
to the systems engineering process within the SPO for final resolution.  The SPO or an authority 
higher than the SPO then made final decision.   
The major responsibilities of the SPO and the government were to develop and manage 
requirements.  They can be divided onto three areas: 
• Develop and document the initial requirements set for the top-level system 
specification and the top-level system architecture. 
• Trade off specification requirements versus design risk during development. 
• Constrain requirements creep. 
The Air Force SPO and Development Planning organization did an admirable job in 
developing and documenting the requirements and ensuring they were balanced and attainable.  
The SPO’s performance in exercising their responsibility to balance the requirements with the 
design risk was less than stellar.  The fear of reopening the fixed price contract with Lockheed 
was a factor, as was the attitude of holding the contractor responsible for the contract they 
signed.   
Requirements were controlled exceptionally well during development.  The problem that 
most plagues both management and engineering groups is requirements creep, but the C-5 
succeeded in avoiding this damage.  Creep comes from “over perfect” engineering:  continuously 
trying to improve an acceptable design to make it better.  Systems engineers must follow the 
mantra of “better is the enemy of good enough.” The greatest contributor to requirements creep, 
however, is often the user.  If personnel from the user community have constant access to the 
contractor, design changes will be continuous and never ending.  The C-5 SPO team managed 
the inputs of non-SPO people by controlling all changes via the SPO’s Configuration Control 
Board (CCB).  Lockheed’s process for controlling changes also used a CCB, but their first line of 
defense was the Chief Engineer design meetings.   
C-5 Requirements Process Summary 
The systems engineering process used to develop a balanced set of requirements during 
concept exploration was a model for the application of operational mission analysis.  The 
organization responsible for developing the requirements took the lead and fully involved all the 
organizations that could affect decisions.  All organizations that would be affected by the 
decisions were contributors.  The requirements for the system were well balanced and the design 
and production were accurately judged to be feasible with the state-of-the-art technologies.   
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3.2 C-5 Learning Principle 2:  Total Package Procurement Concept (TPPC) 
The contract type for the C-5A was specified to be the new Total Package Procurement 
Concept (TPPC) championed by the Air Force and DoD.  The TPPC contract was a firm fixed 
price incentive fee contract for the development of the system and a first production quantity of 
58 aircraft (Run A).  The contract also included an option for a second quantity purchase of 57 
aircraft (Run B).  Because of its impact on program cost, the relationship between the basic 
contract for Run A and the option for Run B is important to follow throughout this case study.  
The price for Run B aircraft was based on the price paid for Run A aircraft, but a cost 
acceleration clause allowed the contractor to recoup losses as the number of aircraft in Run B 
increased.  There was also an option for a third production lot of 100 aircraft, called Run C, but it 
was never exercised because funding did not suffice to purchase all of the Run B aircraft. 
TPPC was announced to the contractors and the Source Selection Team on 25 February 
1965 as the acquisition process for the C-5A program.  Aligning the contract and assessing the 
impact would delay the Source Selection by one month [6].  This was the first application of 
TPPC anywhere in the DoD.   
TPPC was the acquisition reform of its day.  Because it played a dominant role in the 
success and the failures of the C-5A program, its genesis is noteworthy3. 
TPPC was a new concept for weapons system procurement devised by the Honorable 
Robert H. Charles, Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Installations and Logistics.  The 
purposes were to enhance the competitive environment and to create incentives for cost-efficient 
programs that would reward contractors for controlling development and production costs.  
Secretary Charles had previously worked for McDonnell Aircraft Corp. and had a “...first hand 
view of the problems created by the lack of competition that existed under the contractual 
arrangements employed on weapons acquisition programs” [6, p. 13].  During the 1950s, 
contractors commonly submitted bids with an optimistically low price for development, but the 
average cost overrun by the time development and production were complete was 320 percent 
[6].  During the early 1960s many initiatives were discussed for increasing competition and 
controlling costs.  Almost all the changes had an objective of better defining the total system 
cost, not just the development cost.  The introduction of life-cycle cost – a vital prerequisite for 
any TPPC – was one of the lasting outcomes of this reform era. 
Secretary Charles introduced his new TPPC at a management conference at Wright-
Patterson Air Force Base on 25 June 1964 ([6, p. 21]).  On November 21, 1964, Secretary of Air 
Force Eugene M. Zuckert proposed application of the TPPC to the CX-HLS, noting:  
I believe it is feasible to use this “life cycle” concept on this 
program.  The CX-HLS is a subsonic transport.  With respect to the 
airframe, there is no large advance in the current state-of-the-art, and the 
technological building blocks are in hand.  The Air Force is able to specify 
the desired performance with precision and with reasonable expectation 
that this performance can be achieved.  The program has already gone 
through exhaustive parametric studies (concept formulation), and will 
                                                 
3 An excellent description of the rationale for the TPPC can be found in [6, pages 13-26], a thesis written 
by two AFIT students in 1970. 
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have gone through project (contract) definition before development 
begins.  There is adequate competition among both the airframe and the 
engine manufactures.  [6] 
Secretary of Defense McNamara officially approved the TPPC for the C-5A program on 
25 February 1965.  The impact of this decision has been discussed at length throughout the 
literature.  Of all the comments by the numerous protagonists and antagonists, one of the most 
profound was made by Poncar and Johnson: 
A concept had now been developed to design, competitively 
procure, and scientifically manage a major weapons system from the 
outset through its operational life.  It would also give assurance that 
performance requirements were tied to definitive cost commitments.  To 
the uninitiated, the simple statements did not appear to have profound 
implications.  In fact, the impact of such statements was not readily 
understood unless one fully appreciated the sophistication inherent in the 
complex weapons systems acquisition process.  The advent of this new 
procurement technique forced complementary changes in planning, 
scientific management, budget, and systems engineering techniques which 
had a long-standing past.  [6, p. 26] 
Acquisition reform is ongoing.  Decision makers must fully understand the programmatic 
impact of each reform, or the subtle features of well-intentioned reforms may well undo the very 
improvements they seek to make.  The systems engineering process must include a thorough 
assessment of the impact of reforms.  Commensurate with this obligation is the responsibility to 
make decision makers aware of potential pitfalls and risks.   
Development Phase 
The TPPC failed because it neither achieved the fundamental objective of developing an 
accurate cost estimate for the program nor controlled cost growth.  It was, however, the first step 
in formulating the contract approach to address the system and life cycle costs.  It also stipulated 
that the prime contractor have Total System Performance Responsibility (TSPR). 
Cost Overrun  
The C-5A program was plagued by cost overruns from the very beginning.  The cost 
overrun was not unexpected by either the Air Force or the contractor [6, 8, 12].  The Air Force 
had predicted a most probable cost of $1.86 billion as opposed to the contractor’s best and final 
estimate of $1.71 billion on 4 September 1965.  The actual cost of the original contract grew by 
another $64 million by December 1965 [6].  No one estimated costs as high as the eventual 
program overrun to $3.5 billion for the development effort plus the 115 aircraft in Run A and 
Run B. 
The enormous cost overrun had multiple causes.  Key reasons included:  (1) the original 
cost estimate was aggressively low, influenced by the contractor’s expectation of an ancillary 
benefit in the form of follow-on for commercial air vehicle design; (2) the perceived low cost 
estimates of the competitors; (3) the redesign of the proposal baseline as the contract baseline in 
four days without an accurate assessment of the impact to the cost; and (4) the aggressively low 
contract weight empty guarantee, coupled with an underestimate of the effort the 
design/production teams would expend to achieve the value. 
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Volumes have been written about the C-5’s cost growth; it caused the most controversy 
and angst over the system.  It plays an important role in this case study because it resulted in 
termination before all the aircraft in Runs A and B were procured.  Cost was a pivotal factor in 
the program because it was hopelessly understated – to the extent that the contractor had no 
chance of meeting the cost submitted in the proposal from the very start.  The important lessons 
lie in what happened to the program because of the low cost estimate and the consideration of 
what might have occurred if the value had been attainable.  Another equally important lesson 
derives from the significant amount of additional resources the government had to allocate to 
correct the problems.   
The TPPC fixed price contract for development and the initial production run of 58 
aircraft proved a fatally flawed strategy.  Underbidding by all three competitors was known and 
acknowledged, but Air Force and DoD decision makers signed the contract anyway [10].  The 
prevailing attitude by the government during the first five years of the contract was, “Let’s hold 
their feet to the fire; they signed the contract.” There is no question that Lockheed’s cost overrun 
was due in part to the intensive effort to design and manufacture parts and assemblies to the 
lowest possible weight [5 (Ormsby)], but this was not the dominant factor in the overrun [6].  In 
fact, the cost overrun of the C-5A program resulted from six primary factors: 
• The TPPC failed to meet its objectives. 
• Both the original proposal and the proposal as modified on 4 September 1965 
contained an aggressively low cost proposal for the tasks. 
• The aircraft redesign, accomplished in a mere four days, was inadequately 
reviewed and resulted in higher than expected technical risk. 
• The guaranteed weight empty stipulation, with its attendant cost penalty in the 
contract, drove Lockheed over the engineering budget. 
• The performance requirements for range and payload required an inordinate 
amount of testing, analysis, and refinement of the drag, the flap/slat design, and 
the flap/slat settings. 
• The environment of the 1960s and the technological unknowns that existed during 
the design and development phase would have caused a program overrun no 
matter which contractor built the aircraft [6, p. 60].  High inflation, the demands 
of Vietnam, and technical difficulties previously neither experienced nor 
envisioned but related simply to the size of the aircraft led to unplanned additional 
effort.    
3.3 C-5 Learning Principle 3:  Guaranteed Weight 
Interviews4 with key personnel confirm that one element characterizes the systems 
engineering process during the C-5A design:  the allocation of aircraft weight empty throughout 
the subsystems and structure of the aircraft.  The allocation of aircraft weight empty to all the 
subsystem design teams played a crucial part of the overall program, first, because weight is 
always a vital technical design parameter for airplanes, and second, because the value was 
guaranteed in the C-5A contract.  The contract included a large cost penalty to the contractor if 
any delivered aircraft exceeded the value.   
                                                 
4 The people interviewed are listed in Appendix 2, Interviews. 
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Proposal Phase 
The importance of early decisions in the life of a program cannot be over emphasized.  
The need for the systems engineering process to thoroughly consider potential consequences of 
seemingly simple decisions and to assess alternatives is never more important than during the 
source selection process and the time period leading up the contract approval. 
Several events occurred during the proposal phase that would forever influence the 
outcome of the C-5A program.  The systems engineering process did not adequately assess the 
potential impacts of programmatic decisions, yet those decisions affected the design, production, 
and operation of the system.  The systems engineers recognized that technical trade offs were 
vital to the program.  Equally important were decisions about technical design alternatives made 
between go-ahead and the preliminary design review.  These were recognized to have long-term 
ramifications on the system and received the attention in trade studies required to fully assess the 
consequences of the choices.  By the time the program reached Critical Design Review (CDR) 
the design was essentially finished and the remaining effort was expended in building the parts 
and assembly and checkout.  Changes after CDR were difficult, expensive, and had a negative 
cost impact, but were made in the constant effort to reduce weight.   
The Air Force decision to advise the C-5A bidders that claims made in the proposal by 
the offering contractor would be included in the final specification had far-reaching impacts on 
the design.  Lockheed believed that Boeing had underestimated the weight empty of their 
proposed air vehicle and therefore felt compelled to propose an ambitious, but reasonable, 
estimate for the vehicle weight empty of 302,494 pounds [6].  By the proposal’s own admission, 
the actual weight empty estimate was a larger 318,415 pounds for the baseline, which included a 
5% growth factor.  However, the contractor claimed the actual value of 302,494 could be 
achieved by realizing advances in technology, materials, and production techniques.  The Air 
Force decided to place the lower weight empty value in the specification as a firm requirement 
and included a penalty clause in the contract that made the contractor liable for a penalty of 
$10,000 per pound of weight empty over and above the stipulated value for each aircraft.  The 
contractor accepted the value in the contract! Compounding the impact of the decision to propose 
an aggressive weight empty, the contractor also proposed aggressive values for range and 
payload, which the Air Force also converted into firm specification requirements.  For the design 
engineering process these decisions had the consequence of removing most, if not all, of the 
technical management reserve that the design team could use to make trade offs between 
subsystems, design approaches, and operational requirements. 
A second major influencing event occurred following the source selection.  The 
competing contractors were briefed on the Air Force’s evaluation of their proposals in late 
August 1965.  The purpose of briefing each contractor separately was to prepare for a final 
negotiation on specification requirements and for the contractor’s best and final offer on cost.  
The Air Force evaluation team advised Lockheed that their airport performance, specifically 
takeoff distance, was inadequate to meet the Air Force operational requirements.  The evaluation 
team calculated that the Lockheed wing was too small and that the leading edge and trailing edge 
flaps would provide less lift than estimated in the proposal.  To stay competitive, Lockheed 
redesigned their aircraft in four days, in effect negating much of the careful balancing of the 
design represented in the original April 1965 proposal.  The new configuration increased the 
leading-edge flaps to full span, changed the design of the trailing-edge flaps, and increased the 
wing area from 5,600 square feet 6,200 square feet.  In the same four days, the carefully 
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balanced and well-integrated cost, schedule, and performance baseline of the original proposal 
was recalculated and resubmitted.  Lockheed agreed to change their design, increased the 
specified weight empty in the new proposal from 302,494 pounds to 318,469 pounds, and raised 
their target cost estimate from $1.65 billion to $1.71 billion.  Because of the short time available 
to assess the impact of the changes, however, these changes fell short of what was eventually 
required.   
The third complicating factor during the proposal phase was Lockheed’s decision to 
allocate the smallest possible cost for the development and production costs.  This corporate 
decision was influenced by the benefit that the company could realize from future contracts for a 
large civilian transport aircraft.  All three of the competing contractors were planning on such a 
synergy, so that much of the C-5 effort would underpin a commercial venture for a modern large 
airliner.  In fact, technology based on the C-5 gave birth to the Douglas DC-10, the Boeing 747, 
and the Lockheed L-1011.  However, Lockheed never received the total benefit of winning the 
C-5A competition [5].  Their proposed price was far lower than would be required to 
successfully complete development and production of the C-5A aircraft, and Lockheed did not 
realize a direct and substantial benefit to the L-1011. 
Effect of Guaranteed Weight Empty 
The inability of the design to meet the required fatigue life can be traced exclusively to 
the Air Force’s insistence that the contractor meet the required guaranteed weight empty.  As 
noted, the Air Force would not accept delivery of any overweight airplanes without a punitive 
cost penalty to the contractor.  However, Lockheed contributed to the problem because of the 
low estimate for weight empty and the insufficient growth margin.  The Air Force included the 
guaranteed weight empty in the specification because of the belief that lower weight empty 
means lower costs, and because of the difficulties the DoD had experienced in defending the F-
111 program.5 Finally, the Pentagon held to the righteous view that the government should hold 
Lockheed responsible because they had signed a contract and should hold them to their 
commitment [5 (Ormsby, Smithers, Wood)].   
The weight empty was problematic from the very start of the contract and was 
exacerbated by the drag.  Wind tunnel testing in October 1965 showed far more drag than the 
contractor had predicted during the concept exploration assessments.  Drag was too high by 41 
counts.  (A count of drag is aerodynamic jargon for 0.001 of drag coefficient.6) During the next 
months, Lockheed redesigned the fuselage fairings, the pylon fairing, and the landing gear pods 
and finally reduced the drag to 0.0256 by their estimate, but the added fairings added 3300 
pounds of weight [6, 9].  The normal growth of weight from go-ahead to first flight also started 
to show itself.  Historically, weight grows by 6% to 10%, depending on the degree to which the 
technology state of the art is challenged, as the design evolves to CDR and again during 
production as necessary and desired changes surface.   
                                                 
5 While a lighter aircraft will in general be less expensive on a dollars-per-pound basis, it is not so for a 
fixed set of requirements. For a given set of requirements, a lighter aircraft will be more expensive because of the 
added effort to over-constrain a technical parameter that would naturally seek its balance in the whole set of system 
requirements.  
6 The government team’s evaluation of the drag during the source selection predicted a drag coefficient of 
0.0265 or 265 counts versus the contractor’s claimed 250 counts. 
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The SPO was well aware of the unrealistically low weight value in the specification, the 
small likelihood of meeting it, and the impact it exerted on cost and fatigue life.  To determine 
how the contractor was addressing the problem and how it could be brought under control, the 
SPO sent Lockheed’s program manager a letter on 5 January 1967, asking for a position from the 
company on performance.  The contractor did not respond to the letter [6].  A second letter was 
sent on 13 January, and again was never answered.  On 23 January 1967, the program manager 
met with the SPO at WPAFB and asked that Lockheed be allowed to change the engine thrust 
rating at sea level from a hot day to a tropical day.  He also promised that Lockheed would 
manage GE to a higher thrust engine – from 41,000 pounds to 50,000 pounds thrust – at a cost 
increase to the government of only $5.12 million and would meet all performance requirements, , 
and asked that the SPO to remove the weight empty from the specification [6].  Because the Air 
Force could see no benefits accruing to the government from the changes, the SPO denied the 
request.  The senior Air Force leadership in the Pentagon concurred with the SPO. 
On 1 February, the SPO sent a cure notice to the contractor, tantamount to a definitive 
statement that the government was on the verge of canceling the contract.  Lockheed never 
brought the weight up again, immediately removed 6,000 pounds from the wing (see Figure 3-4) 
and responded to the cure notice by assuring the government that they would meet all 
performance requirements of the specification.  In short, the net result of the contractor’s 
implementing their responsibility under the TSPR clause of the contract and highlighting a major 
design risk to the SPO was to incur a cure notice. 
Effect of Guaranteed Weight Empty on the Design 
The story of the weight empty on the C-5A provides a wealth of insight into the aircraft 
design process and the application of the system engineering process.  The specification included 
very demanding aircraft performance requirements  as well as a demanding weight empty, and 
the Air Force insisted on near-perfect efficiency in the design and performance of the aircraft, 
leaving little room for trade off between requirements and weight as the design matured.  The 
Air Force’s reluctance to trade off any of the demanding requirements set the stage for the C-5 
weight problems that were to follow.   
As previously described, during source selection the Air Force notified all competitors 
about various proposal deficiencies that needed to be corrected and resubmitted and gave them 
only four days to review, refine, correct, and resubmit the proposals.  Despite the many months 
of work developing initial design proposals that accurately described aircraft performance and 
specifications, each competitor was forced to make serious changes in a matter of days.  The 
Boeing aircraft required few changes, the Douglas aircraft was judged deficient, and Lockheed, 
the ultimate winner, made considerable changes to the wing, leading-edge flaps, engine thrust 
reversers, and inlets.  It was impossible to replicate all the analysis, testing, and data that had 
gone into the original proposal in four days.  This rush to contract contributed to a contractual 
guaranteed weight empty that was unattainable.   
Problems in meeting the guaranteed weight empty requirement ultimately resulted from 
the approach Lockheed used to produce its weight estimates for the initial design proposal, the 
revised proposal guaranteed weight empty, and the expected weight growth.  Lockheed 
management applied a 5% reduction factor to the originally developed weight empty to arrive at 
the original proposal value of 302,495 pounds.  This factor was extrapolated from smaller 
aircraft and assumed technological advances that would lead to future weight savings.  To 
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account for the unknown weights of the redesign that occurred in the first four days of September 
1965, Lockheed adjusted the new guaranteed weight empty to a value of 318,469 pounds.  This 
figure was based on an estimate for the new wing area structure and flap/slat changes.  Had the 
proposed new weight value been based on the engineering estimate without the 5% reduction, 
the contractor would have retained some design flexibility.  After the months of analysis that had 
gone into achieving the weight estimate for the original design, Lockheed took a daring risk to 
include the weight of the redesign in the 318,469 pound estimate, a decision that would plague 
the development of the C-5 for the remainder of the design program.   
The expected weight growth used in determining the target weight of the aircraft was 
allocated on the basis of experience with the C-141.  However, these allocations were 
fundamentally flawed because they were based on skewed guaranteed weight empty.  Table 3-2 
shows the computations of the target weight while Figure 3-3 shows the track from contract 
award to first flight.7  
Table 3-2.  C-5A Post Design Weight Analysis Report, Vol. II [11] 
The goal of the target weight calculation was for the “air vehicle to be initially designed 
to a weight level sufficiently low to permit reasonable weight growth without exceeding 
guaranteed weight at the time of delivery” [11].  Weight growth allowances of 4% of the 
controllable weight, 1.5% for manufacturing variations prior to first flight, and .5% for basic 
vehicle weight growth account for an initial target weight that is approximately 5% below 
operation weight (OW).  In guaranteed weight empty terms, this initial target weight was over 
2000 pounds less than that listed in the original proposal.  If the aircraft had not been redesigned, 
                                                 
7 Note that Figure 3-3 and Table 3-2 list operating weight instead of guaranteed weight empty. The 
operating weight for these tables is equal to guaranteed weight empty plus 5435 pounds of operating equipment. 
This same difference will reappear in Figures 3-4 and 3-5. 
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this methodology would have been a logical way to meet the goal.  However, the redesigned 
wing, coupled with the aggressive weight goals, made meeting the guaranteed weight empty goal 
almost impossible.   
 
Figure 3-3.  Lockheed’s Projected Weight Track vs. Phase [11] 
In mid 1966, when the impacts of the redesign were better understood, the SPO 
recognized and alerted Lockheed to the problems.  Lockheed’s requests that the SPO increase the 
guaranteed weight empty requirement by 14,000 pounds were denied, as were requests to pursue 
other possible solutions in meeting requirements such as increasing engine thrust.  When it 
became clear that the Air Force had no intention of making any design tradeoffs pertaining to 
weight and performance, Lockheed began an extensive and ambitious program of monitoring, 
controlling, and reducing aircraft weight.   
Lockheed’s weight reduction program consisted of three distinct phases, each spanning a 
specific time in the design and development process.  The first phase, already in progress when 
the contract was awarded, was to terminate at the completion of the preliminary design.  The 
second phase continued from that point to the first flight, and the third phase was to end when 
the first full specification C-5 was delivered.  Originally structured to concentrate efforts on 
monitoring and controlling weight growth, it evolved into a plan dedicated primarily to reduce 
weight and cost.   
During phase I, the target weight allocations were broken down and distributed to the 
many functional design groups.  This breakdown included specific job packages so that each 
team could clearly see the goals.  Lockheed developed procedures to use the target weights and 
allocations as a control over the release of job packages for the design:  no jobs were to be 
released that were over the target weight.  The efforts to reduce weight became more challenging 
when further detailed analysis dictated configuration changes that drove revisions to the weight 
allocations.  Design groups found themselves having to do more with less allowance for weight.  
Red and Gold flag meetings consistently monitored the progress of the efforts [11]. 
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One approach to allocating weight among different areas was the creation of two reserve 
weight funds.  If a job was completed under weight, half of that weight was put into each fund.  
One fund was used as a source of allocation for future weight growth, and the other was for jobs 
not likely to be completed under target weight.  Despite their utility, both reserve funds were 
cancelled and transformed into a Target Weight reserve fund that served to accomplish the same 
goal.   
In addition to the weight meetings that occurred on all levels during the development, 
Lockheed had programs to encourage innovative weight reduction ideas among employees.  The 
first program lacked incentives, but still managed to gather over 1700 ideas, of which 64 were 
incorporated for a weight savings of approximately 4000 pounds.  This program was replaced at 
50% design release with a program that gave $200 per pound to employees with weight savings 
ideas that were eventually incorporated into the aircraft [11].  Though records for the payout and 
weight saved were not well maintained, Lockheed stated this program was worthwhile.   
Other mechanisms to restrict and reduce weight during phase I included controlling the 
nominal thickness of aluminum sheet metal, chemical milling of parts to remove excess material, 
and monitoring the thickness of paint at application.  Lockheed also developed programs for 
contract vendors to meet weight target allocations or face penalties for overweight deliveries.  
These and the many other aggressive weight reduction programs still fell short of enabling 
Lockheed to meet its target at 50% release.   
Phase II was implemented during production at a time when it became clear that extreme 
measures had to be taken to meet guaranteed weight empty.  It was equally aggressive, and 
included some of the same efforts seen in the previous phase.  A Red Flag/Gold Flag report led 
to the “Save Cost and Limit Pounds” program , called SCALP.  SCALP combined the weight 
and cost relationship to evaluate parts considered for weight reduction.  It devised three clear 
guidelines.  Changes of five pounds or less had to cost less than $40 per pound to implement, and 
changes of more than five pounds less than $75.  The last guideline gave special priority to 
changes that saved cost and weight.  High cost and weight areas of the aircraft were reviewed 
using these principles to further the weight reduction efforts in an affordable manner.  Because 
this program was initiated at the completion of the stress analysis, it was applied to many over-
strengthened areas for a large weight savings.   
The final phase of the weight reduction efforts carried over many of the same programs 
over from both phases I and II.  They included monthly Red & Gold reports and meetings to 
monitor weight and cost and the continuation of the SCALP program on a limited scale.  
Because phase III occurred during flight test, any changes with large manufacturing impacts 
were not considered programmatically feasible.   
The weight reduction efforts were so concentrated on conserving cost that they 
compromised the ability to meet other requirements.  The negative consequences of the weight 
reduction efforts for the “over strengthened” areas became very apparent after the 1969 static test 
failure of the wing at 125% of the design limit load.  A wing that had been thoroughly and 
meticulously designed for the original proposal had borne a large burden of the weight reduction 
efforts on a heavier aircraft.  From the estimated weight report, in the time frame starting with 
the 60% design release point and proceeding to the actual weight of the ninth aircraft, the overall 
weight of the wing was reduced by almost 4000 pounds, or about 4.5%.  At one point in the 
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wing’s development, it had reached a low weight of 78,100 pounds, 8% below the weight at 
proposal.  The progression of the wing weight can be seen in Figure 3-4.   
 
 
Figure 3-4.  Actual Weight Data for C-5A Through the Ninth Delivered Aircraft [11] 
The overall aircraft saw a low guaranteed weight empty of 310,000 pounds in July of 
1966 before the impacts of the redesign were fully understood.  The guaranteed weight empty 
then immediately increased to almost 323,000 pounds before Lockheed again tried to reduce 
system weight.  All of the working group weight trends can be found in Reference 11; the data 
shows that the wing, tail, and control surface groups all demonstrated very significant decreases 
in weight, while the weight of the aircraft, specifically the body, showed considerable increases.  
The summary data for aircraft total weight is shown in Figure 3-5. 
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 Figure 3-5.  Actual Total Aircraft Weight Data Through the Ninth Aircraft [11] 
During the period that followed the second static test failure in March 1971, it was 
determined that payload and maneuvers used throughout the operational fleet of C-5 aircraft built 
under the original contract had to be limited.  Additionally, the widespread fatigue cracks 
appearing in the fatigue test articles and in the test aircraft forced the SPO to issue restrictions for 
maneuvers, payload, operations in turbulence, and ground-air-ground cycles.  The new limits on 
operational usage yielded a service life prediction of 8,000 hours, far short of the required 30,000 
hours of life at a more severe usage spectrum. 
Lockheed’s new wing design of the late 1970s would remedy this problem via retrofit.  
The completed wing redesign brought the service life of the C-5A up to the design specifications 
and the aircraft weight to a guaranteed weight empty of 332,500 pounds.  Ironically enough, this 
weight value is just less than 5%, or about 14,000 pounds, over the original guaranteed weight 
empty of 318,469 given in the second proposal.  Had Lockheed been more conservative in 
estimating the revised guaranteed weight empty and provided a more typical growth factor to the 
revised guaranteed weight empty for the contract, in all likelihood the weight empty and the 
fatigue requirements would have been satisfied.  On the other hand, the Air Force’s 
unwillingness to accept tradeoffs or any deviations from the contract contributed to the short 
service life. 
The weight issues in the C-5 program underscore the importance and the implications of 
decisions that at the time seem to have small consequences.  In this case, the problems were 
further compounded by the lack of customer flexibility during program development.  The C-5A 
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program took weight monitoring, weight control, and weight reduction efforts to the extreme and 
did a good job of creating the framework of how the process should work.   
New Weight Allocations 
After the SPO rejected Lockheed’s request for weight relief and issued the cure notice, 
the design groups received new (lower) weight allocations.  The result was far-reaching.  The 
weight allocation for the wing group design team was reduced from 85,750 pounds in January 
1967 to 82,000 pounds in June 1967 as shown in Figure 3-4.  The wing design team used a 
design stress level 40 percent higher than industry-accepted practices for transport aircraft and 40 
percent higher than those used in the design of the C-141 wing.8 Friction-fit, taper-lock titanium 
fasteners were used extensively in the wing.  So precious was every ounce that the 
manufacturing process stipulated a 32-step chemical milling process for the wing skins.  
Lockheed implemented numerous innovative initiatives during the late design and early 
manufacturing timeframe, some of which were untested on previous applications.  Because of 
the schedule requirement to fly in April 1968 and an $11 million penalty for late deliveries, there 
was little time for risk reduction assessments and tests in the laboratory.  Consequently, many of 
the new changes were implemented for the first time on the production vehicles. 
Aircraft Weight Empty and Its Effect on Cost 
The impetus to place a guaranteed aircraft weight empty requirement in the specification 
of the C-5A contract came not only from the controversy over weight increase in the F-111 
program, but also from the classic relationship between cost and aircraft weight empty.  All three 
of the important cost values – development cost, production cost, and life-cycle cost – increase 
with aircraft weight empty.  Most of the cost models that existed in the 1960s and 1970s heavily 
favored weight empty as a dominant parameter in estimating a project’s most probable cost.  The 
trend line clearly showed that a lighter aircraft would be less costly.   
The subtle danger of using this obvious trend without fully understanding the 
implications of the behavior of weight at each specific point can lead to a faulty conclusion.  The 
behavior of cost and weight does not follow the trend line once the aircraft is selected to meet a 
specific set of requirements.  Weight empty may vary among the different aircraft design 
approaches companies propose to satisfy the set of requirements (wing sweep, number of 
engines, “T” tail, materials, etc.), but the variation is generally small and is part of the scatter 
around a curve drawn through the cost-versus-weight data points.   
The C-5A serves as a good example to explain the behavior of weight and cost about a 
specific point.  For any given set of requirements, such as those derived for the C-5A, and for the 
selected aircraft design approach of Lockheed, there is a weight empty that would result from the 
systems engineering process.  As the systems engineering process balances the aircraft features 
or engineering parameters, such as drag, thrust, and cost (development, production, and life-
cycle), to satisfy the specified performance requirements for range, payload, cruise altitude, 
cruise Mach number, takeoff distance, and landing distance, it derives the feature or parameter of 
weight.  The resultant weight empty would be the weight that should naturally evolve.  Thus, the 
                                                 
8 The wing design was conducted in England because of the shortage of engineers available to Lockheed in 
the United States. They performed admirably and were an outstanding team, led by Lockheed engineering manager 
Ed Gustafson [1].  
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solid linear trend line in Figure 3-6 is actually made up of many different aircraft empty weights, 
each derived from systems engineering processes to satisfy that particular aircraft set of 
requirements.9 Clearly, if the any of the requirements in the selected set change, the cost and 
weight would vary along the trend line. 
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Figure 3-6.  Cost Behavior as Weight Changes 
Examine what would happen if a feature of the design, such as the empty weight, is 
arbitrarily elevated to the level of a requirement at the same priority as a true requirement, such 
as payload or range.  Consider a fixed set of performance requirements, n, which exists in a fixed 
space, K.  A variable set of features or parameters for each design approach exists to satisfy the 
set of requirements, n.  One of these features is the weight empty, We, that would normally 
evolve from the balanced application of the systems engineering process for the specific 
configuration.  The solid line in Figure 3-7 represents all the Wes that resulted from aircraft 
designs that met their sets of requirements, n1, n2, n3,........nn, in K.  This trend is real, because it 
is plotted from actual data, and, if used as plotted, it is an accurate indicator of the relationship 
between weight and cost.  However, if the set of requirements is fixed and one of the parameters 
of the design is artificially managed, the trend line is no longer applicable because that is not 
how the solid line was derived.  Now the relationship has to be reassessed. 
In fact, the relationship between weight and cost is nonlinear when the set of 
requirements is fixed and weight is artificially changed.  Postulate what happens if some external 
force, Dp (representing a change of pressure on weight), is increased at that We.  For the specific 
                                                 
9 New materials and manufacturing techniques will change We, a consideration Lockheed used when the 
proposed empty weight was 5% less than the value derived from the parametric estimate. 
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aircraft, the weight will go down, moving to the left.  But to save weight, extraordinary design 
and production techniques will be required and these are more expensive than the design and 
production approach the systems engineering process would have developed for the initial We.  
So as the weight empty decreases, the cost increases! As Dp increases further it becomes more 
and more difficult to reduce the weight, until finally the cost increases asymptotically to the 
minimum possible weight, Wmin.  There is also an extreme negative impact on the schedule, 
because work will expand and be more difficult to accomplish.  Eventually, one of the 
requirements in the set, n, will be breached, as depicted as the curved line in Figure 3-6.  In the 
case of the C-5A, static strength and fatigue life were no longer attainable.   
Note what happens to the cost as the design moves away from We if the pressure on 
weight decreases.  Initially, as weight increases, the cost decreases.  However, this only occurs 
when the increase is small, because the cost of raw materials will eventually drive cost up with 
increasing weight.  When weight increases, it is only a matter of pounds before one of the 
requirements in the set, n, is breached.  Thus, allowing weight to be unconstrained may seem 
attractive at first, but it will result in exactly the opposite results than those desired. 
The actual controlling factors on weight empty are the set of requirements, n.  As weight 
decreases, eventually system requirements will be breached.  In the case of the C-5A, the static 
strength and the service life requirements were violated.  Had the weight been allowed to grow, 
one of the performance requirements (range, take off distance, etc.) would have been breached.  
This was exactly the SPO’s concern and was a factor in not yielding the weight allowance sought 
by Lockheed in January 1967. 
Systems Engineering Actions During Weight Growth 
The systems engineering process effectively allocated the guaranteed weight empty to the 
design groups and developed processes by which design teams and production teams were 
rewarded for saving weight.  The problem that faced the process, the design team, and the 
production floor was that the weight allocation was inadequate and inconsistent with the budget 
allocation. 
The structural designers adopted a rational strategy in face of limited weight relief:  
design the structure for ultra light weight, design close to the margins (and they all knew the 
design was close to the margins), and enter the test phase knowing that strength and fatigue “hot 
spots” were inevitable [5 (Ormsby, Smithers, et al.)].  The approach was based on the premise 
that the number of hot spots found during testing would be limited to a few areas that could be 
relatively easily repaired through retrofit.  In fact, this strategy worked well for the fuselage, 
landing gear, vertical and horizontal tails, wing leading-edge slats and supporting structure, and 
wing trailing-edge surfaces and supporting structure.  The pylon and the basic wing structure, 
however, experienced extensive fatigue cracking and were replaced in their entirety. 
The decision to place the guaranteed weight empty in the contract constituted one of the 
glaring weaknesses of the program.  As Lockheed attempted to meet the aggressively understated 
weight guarantee stipulated in the contract, the situation compounded negatively at every turn.  
Lockheed’s systems engineering process only predicted that the weight could very well be 
exceeded and there would be a commensurate impact on program cost, payload, and airport 
performance.  At no time did the process attempt a quantitative projection or even consider a 
range of potential outcomes.  Thus, it only addressed qualitative concerns, thereby leaving the 
decision process in the hands of others. 
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3.4 C-5 Learning Principle 4:  Independent Review Team 
The systems engineering process employed by the Air Force SPO and the systems 
engineering process employed by Lockheed were vastly different.  The SPO managed the 
requirements and the contractor managed the design to meet the requirements.  If the design 
could not meet the requirements, cost and schedule risk increased exponentially as the disparity 
between the expected and estimated performance increased.  The SPO’s responsibility was to be 
technically astute enough to understand the implications for the design levied by the 
requirements as a whole (operational effectiveness) and by each requirement (risk).  Lockheed’s 
systems engineering process, used in conjunction with the design process, highlighted the design 
risk and the consequences that achieving the specification performance had for technical, cost, 
and schedule risks.  When the conflict between the requirements and the design surfaced, the 
SPO assessment and systems engineering process should have been able to evaluate the 
reduction in performance relative to the overall mission and the ability to complete the 
fundamental job at hand, i.e., move an Army division’s equipment to the war zone. 
Cure Notice and the First Two IRTs 
During the latter half of 1966 and into January 1967, Lockheed actively expressed to the 
SPO the advantages to the program if the SPO would remove the guaranteed weight empty from 
the contract.  The contractor also requested authorization to manage and fund GE by an 
additional $5.12 million to increase the thrust to 50,000 pounds from the GE–Air Force contract 
value of 41,000 pounds10 [5 (Swisher, Ormsby, Posson); 6, p. 99].  Following the SPO’s refusal 
on 23 January 1967 and the confirmation by the senior Air Force leadership in the Pentagon, the 
SPO issued Lockheed a cure notice on 1 February 1967.   
The impact on Lockheed’s engineering process has already been described.  As an 
additional response to the cure notice, Lockheed chartered an internal review team (IRT) to 
assess the design for the company and the SPO.  Headquarters Air Force also requested an 
independent assessment and Maj. Gen. James T. Stewart, ASD/CC, tasked the Defense Advisory 
Group (DAG) to form an IRT, which conducted the review during March and April 1967, and 
concluded: 
• That the contactor is doing a competent, responsible, and in many areas, an 
imaginative job; 
• That all the specified performance except landing distance appears to be within reach, 
as judged from the drawing release point which is estimated as corresponding to the 
75 percent of the final empty weight.  The landing distance, however, is likely to be 
exceeded by about 250 feet; 
• That the empty weight as a guaranteed item is likely to be over specifications by 
about 4,000 pounds; 
• That continued vigorous efforts in all areas is required; all the performance must fall 
on the optimistic edge of the calculation accuracy range, before the guarantees can be 
                                                 
10 General Electric agreed with the Lockheed proposal and was present at the meeting. They felt the need to 
stay in competition with Pratt and Whitney for the Boeing 747 development. The weight was increasing on the 747, 
so Boeing had asked P&W to increase thrust to maintain system performance:  
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met, and improvements in one area are likely to be required to compensate for falling 
somewhat short in one of the others [6].   
After the two IRT assessments, Lockheed’s reconfirmation of the commitment to meet all 
requirements, and the new weight allocations to the designers, the program proceeded toward 
full-scale structural ground testing and the flight test program.   
Validation and Verification:  Development, Flight, and Operational Test 
The development test process required extensive laboratory testing to prove the design, 
using buildup tests from component to subassembly to subsystem.  Both static and fatigue tests 
were required for the full-scale aircraft structure.  The full-scale static test article for the structure 
is shown in Figure 3-7 [12].  The landing gear static test article was a separate assembly. 
 
Figure 3-7.  Static Test Article [12] 
The systems engineering process also developed a suite of test articles required to prove 
compliance with the 30,000-hour service life requirement.  These test articles are shown in 
Figure 3-8, and include the test article nomenclature used by the program [12].  The test fixture 
X993, noted as Expedited Wing, was built because the Scientific Advisory Board panel 
recommended it to the SPO in June 1971.  The device was added to the program in an attempt to 
obtain early fatigue test life data. 
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 Figure 3-8.  Fatigue Test Articles [12] 
Both the government and the contractor were heavily involved in planning and testing 
these articles.  The contractor was responsible for developing the test plans; the Air Force was 
responsible for approving the plans and the final report [5 (Smithers)].  The joint teams working 
on the test articles cooperated in developing the test conditions and assessing the final results.  
This cooperation worked well when the objectives were mutually inclusive.  However, when the 
appearance of fatigue problems accelerated in 1969, the Air Force investigated the possibility of 
accelerating the test articles and inserting another test article in the test program, but Lockheed 
could not find a way to comply because of schedule conflicts.  When the widespread cracking in 
the wing fatigue article was obvious, almost all the aircraft or the parts were complete.  So, while 
the systems engineering process developed the rationale for the test articles, the results did not 
become available in time to influence production.11  
Static and Fatigue Tests 
Throughout the remainder of 1967 and into 1968, both Lockheed and the SPO 
engineering teams became increasingly concerned about the wing static strength and the fatigue 
life.  By mid-1969, serious problems were apparent.  The full-scale static test article, X999 (see 
Figure 3-8), failed structurally at 123 percent of the design ultimate load.  The failure occurred at 
the wing fuselage junction at the center wing box carry-through structure to the fuselage.  The 
fault was traced to the structural model, which showed a continuous load path through the spar 
caps.  In fact, the caps carried little load and the load path became discontinuous [5, Smithers].  
The parts were redesigned, but failed at 126%.  Flight and operational aircraft were placed under 
flight limits to restrict high load factor maneuvers. 
In 1969, flight test air vehicle No. 3 had already exhibited fatigue cracks in the rear beam 
cap of the wing.  In October 1970, the full-scale fatigue article, X998, had developed initial 
cracking after a mere 9,000 hours of the required 120,000 hours of the 15 simulated Mission 
                                                 
11 The contract was awarded in September 1965, the first flight occurred in June 1968, and the last of the 81 
aircraft was delivered in May 1973, underscoring a high degree of concurrency. 
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Profiles required by the fatigue test plan.  In December 1970, the second wing of fatigue test 
article X993 entered testing.  By September 1971, the first fatigue test article had accumulated 
15,000 hours and the second had accumulated 33,000 hours.  Testing was terminated because 
both test articles had extensive general cracking.  Figure 3-8 shows the configuration of the full-
scale structural fatigue article for the wing and fuselage of the C-5 aircraft.  The wing is 
composed of three major wing boxes:  center, inner, and outer.  All three wing boxes showed 
general cracking, almost all of it originating from holes fitted with the friction fit titanium 
fasteners.   
In December 1971, a C-5 IRT [13] was formed to review the situation and develop 
alternatives.12 The team assessed the C-5A structure to determine the necessary operational 
restrictions to ensure safety of flight.  The payload and maneuvers were limited, including the 
elimination of terrain following, heavy payload during peacetime, aerial delivery of cargo, and 
operations out of austere unimproved runways.  The team also assessed the structural fatigue life 
of the wing under several sets of Mission Profiles, and developed options A through K to bring 
the wing up to the full service life capability.  These options, which formed the decision basis for 
the eventual redesign and production of a new wing for the operational fleet, are shown in  
Table 3-3. 
Table 3-3.  C-5 Independent Review Team Options A Through K [13] 
 
The new wing design was incorporated on all 81 C-5As and all 50 C-5Bs.  It had 
basically the same three-box design and construction as the original wing, but with added 
thickness to provide strength and lower stress.  The flaps, ailerons, and secondary structure of the 
                                                 
12A complete description of all the fatigue problems for all of the structure can be found in [13]. 
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wing were retained essentially unchanged.  The outer wing box changes were limited to 
redrilling all the fastener holes and refitting the titanium fasteners.  The center and inner wing 
box designs incorporated new frames, spars, skins, and caps.  A net weight increase of 14,641 
pounds for the center and inner wing boxes was necessary to achieve improved structural 
durability and meet the 30,000-hour service life requirement.  The center wing box weight 
increased from 8,562 pounds to 13,807 pounds and the two inner boxes increased from a total of 
29,293 pounds to 39,319 pounds [12].   
While the wing exhibited the most notable fatigue problems, all of the structure was 
affected to some degree.13 The ASD IRT’s final report summarized the fatigue problems 
throughout the structure [13].  Figure 3-9 shows a pie chart of the structural weight and a pie 
chart showing the number of structural modification TCTOs (Time Compliance Technical 
Orders) required throughout the structure.  Table 3-4 shows additional details.  While the wing 
and pylon could not be repaired economically, the rest of the structure could be modified to meet 
the service life requirements of 30,000 hours without completely redesigning the parts.  In tribute 
to the structures design team, the strategy of designing to the close tolerances and completing the 
tests with the idea of repairing the “hot spots” worked exceptionally well for most of the aircraft, 
but the wing and pylon demonstrated widespread cracking.   
 
 
Figure 3-9.  Pie Chart from IRT [14] 
                                                 
13 The engine wing pylon was redesigned and replaced. 
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Table 3-4.  TCTOs for Structural Modifications 
 
SPO Program Management of IRTs 
The SPO was quick to convene IRTs and use their advice.  The first IRT review was 
chartered in March 1967 and was followed by IRTs in 1970, 1971, 1972, and 1975.  The ASC 
IRT, chartered in December 1971, consisted of over 100 people from industry, academia, 
government organizations, and other contractors.  It was assigned to work for a year in Marietta 
with the Lockheed team to resolve the fatigue life issue and plan a solution.  The IRT developed 
the matrix of plans A through H that became the suite of alternatives debated for years before 
selection of a modified Plan K.   
The management of IRTs was one of the responsibilities of the SPO.  The use of IRTs 
was judged a good management tool because it gave the SPO staff access to experts at the 
nationally renowned level.  The C-5A SPO leveraged the results from IRTs by involving the 
highest levels of decision makers in the Air Force.  The systems engineering process set the 
objectives, agenda, and scope of the IRTs, along with the reporting officials for each team.   
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IRT Summary 
The SPO used IRTs to augment their staff and managed their agenda and objectives.  The 
decision that the SPO would manage the IRTs and their reporting process was vital.  Once a 
problem became a programmatic issue, the external process called for an IRT.  In the C-5 case 
the IRT worked for, and reported to, an outside entity and not the SPO director. 
The SPO’s use of IRTs was highly effective, as it led to the development of a set of 
operational limits for the initial maneuvering of the aircraft with the early wing design.  These 
limits allowed worldwide deployment within a safe boundary that still enabled the aircraft to 
utilize most of its heavy cargo carrying capacity.  The SPO and the Air Force also chartered an 
IRT to develop the strategy and requirements for a new wing design that would provide adequate 
static strength and service life.  This effort led to the retrofit of a new wing to all 81 C-5As and 
the Air Force decision to augment the fleet with 50 more aircraft, designated as the C-5B. 
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4.0 SUMMARY 
The four learning principles are repeated in italics and a short summary follows. 
LP 1, Requirements.  The process for developing and documenting the system 
performance requirements involved the User (warfighter), planners, 
developers, and technologists from both the government and industry 
in a coordinated set of trade studies.  It resulted in a well-balanced, 
well-understood set of requirements that fundamentally remained 
unchanged throughout the program. 
The requirements process used for the C-5 worked exceptionally well, as evidenced by 
the stability of the requirements following contract award.  There were several changes to 
requirements during the development, such as the bank angle requirement in the first second 
during power approach.  Other changes were also made in the area of structural design to reduce 
requirements and save weight.  The requirement for the C-5B to operate from an unprepared 
landing field was removed 15 years after the original requirement was levied on the C-5A, and 
reflected a revision in doctrine based on usage of the aircraft in actual mission scenarios.  Thus, 
while several requirements were changed during development, interviews with the participants 
all highlighted the ability to control changes during design and development.  Requirements 
creep was well managed. 
LP 2, Total Package Procurement Concept.  The Total Package Procurement 
Concept (TPPC) employed by the government required a fixed-price, 
incentive fee contract for the design, development, and production of 
58 aircraft.  It included a clause giving Total Systems Performance 
Responsibility (TSPR) to the prime contractor.  TPPC was invented to 
control costs, but it was the underlying cause of the cost overrun and 
limited the number of aircraft purchased under the original contract. 
The TPPC was an attempt to control program costs by requiring a certain type of 
contract.  However, because of the initial low price proposed by Lockheed and the inclusion of 
weight empty as a guaranteed value with an attendant cost penalty, the contract in essence 
became a cost-plus contract with a disincentive fee – clearly an unintended consequence. 
The government eventually paid for most of the cost overrun and corrected the 
inadequate wing and pylon designs by allocating significant additional and unplanned funding to 
redesign the wing and pylon, retrofit the C-5A aircraft, and purchase additional C-5B aircraft 
with the new wing and pylon designs in order to field an adequately sized transport fleet. 
Lockheed suffered severe financial consequences, culminating in a successful request to 
Congress for a guaranteed loan.  The C-5 design team’s experience was not transferred to their 
commercial effort on the L-1011[3].  The student should note that both decisions with significant 
unintended consequences (TPPC and guaranteed weight empty as a specification value with a 
cost penalty) were made prior to contract award.   
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LP 3, Weight Empty Guarantee.  A Weight Empty Guarantee was included in 
the specification as a performance requirement and in the contract as 
a cost penalty for overweight conditions of delivered aircraft.  The 
aircraft Weight Empty Guarantee dominated the traditional aircraft 
performance requirements (range, payload, etc.), increased costs, and 
resulted in a major shortfall in the wing and pylon fatigue life.  The 
stipulation of a Weight Empty Guarantee as a performance 
requirement had far-reaching and significantly deleterious unintended 
consequences. 
The Air Force included the weight empty guarantee in the systems specification as an 
attempt to control potential future growth of the aircraft weight empty during development.  
Stipulating a cost penalty if production airplanes exceeded the weight magnified the effect of 
including this design feature as a system performance requirement.  Numerous unintended 
consequences resulted, the most notable being that the overall design suffered, the wing and 
pylon did not achieve the service life required, and the delivered aircraft still exceeded the 
guaranteed weight.  Including a design feature as a co-equal to the fundamental performance 
requirements caused an imbalance in the systems engineering process by placing an inordinate 
level of emphasis on a single feature.  Since one of the most important purposes of the systems 
engineering process is to balance performance, cost, and schedule, all were compromised when 
an imbalance was purposely inserted into the process. 
LP 4, Independent Review Teams.  The Air Force C-5 Systems Program Office 
employed Independent Review Teams (IRTs) to assemble national 
experts to examine the program and provide recommendations to the 
government.  These problem-solving teams were convened to garner 
the best advice in particular technical areas:  structure design and 
technology, and designs to achieve useful service life. 
The Air Force SPO used IRTs to augment their staff, assess difficult problems, and 
recommend solutions to problems.  The SPO had the power, ability, priority, and senior 
leadership support to quickly rally the best minds in the nation.  The systems engineering process 
developed the agenda, established the teams’ charter, collected data for review, assisted in 
developing the trade study information, and aided in constructing alternative solutions.  The 
IRTs presented the matrix of solutions to the SPO for final selection and approval. 
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Appendix 1 
Completed Friedman Sage Matrix for C-5A 
Table A1-1.  The Friedman Sage Matrix for the C-5A 
             Contractor                         Shared               Government
A. Requirements Def. 
and Management
Competing contractors were funded prior to 
source selection to assess the risk and 
performance for User/Army needs on 
conceptual configurations.
Industry assisted government in technology 
readiness assessment
Government conducted extensive operational 
mission analysis during concept exploration.  
Government, User, contractors worked together, 
under Development Planning leadership.
B. Systems 
Architecture 
Development
Competing contractors allocated systems 
functional architecture to the lowest level of the 
design team, to determine design and 
technology risk.
The contractor and government jointly assessed 
approaches to comply with the user's queries / 
needs
Government developed top level architecture and 
coordinated with the competing contractors for 
risk/performance assessments.  All requirements 
were documented in the System Specifications.
C. System, Subsystem  
Des ign            
Lockheed allocated functional requirements via 
Requirements Allocation Sheets.  Trade 
studies, TPM, budget tracking to estimates, 
and scheduling reviewed weekly with direct 
reports and chief engineer.   
Government and competing contractors shared 
data, but after award of contract to Lockheed, 
communications were more formal.  Government 
measures were in the specifications and penalty 
clauses were added for some areas, but not all.
Government tracked Lockheed progress with 
systems engineering analysis tools and 
engineering discipline tools to predict weight, 
performance and service life.
D. Validation and 
Validation
Systems engineering process allocated 
functional test requirements and determined 
test fixtures, aircraft test assemblies, and 
laboratories.  Lockheed conducted ground and 
developmental flight tests.
Lockheed prepared test plans.  SPO approved test 
plans and approved final results to certify 
completeness.  AF and Lockheed conducted joint 
flight tests.  Government convened Independent 
Review Teams (IRTs) to assemble the Nation’s 
experts in structures to examine the wing and 
recommend solutions.  
Government conducted operational flight tests.  
The SPO determined operational limits for 
maneuvers and loads.  
E. Risk  Management   Risk management conducted at base 
engineering/manufacturing level by 
experienced team.  Not a formal document but 
formal review process during development.
Government and competing contractors assessed 
technology risk and developed systems 
requirements within the state of the art.  During 
development, separate risk assessment  
processes.
Government led development of top level 
requirements to constrain risk to available 
capabilities.  During development, conducted Air 
Force risk assessment and chartered their own 
IRT's.
F. Systems 
Integration &    
Interfaces                 
Lockheed allocated and managed interfaces 
through specifications and ICD's.  Managed 
subcontractors, except General Electric.
SPO managed GFP and support equipment.  
Numerous requests for ECP's because of 
Lockheed requirements for government actions.  
Process was managed effectively.
SPO responsible for interfaces with AF system.  
First system to use 463L pallets and logistics 
system. 
G. Life Cycle  Support  Life Cost Costs trades were the leading 
mentric in the early configuration studies.  
Cost trades became secondary to achieving 
weight during development.
Government and contractors emphasis was on 
reliability, supportability.  First use of AFSCM 375 
series which required early and continuous 
emphasis.
Government developed AFSCM 375 manuals.  
Included reliability requirements and enforced 
design measures to achieve them.
H. Deployment and 
Post Deploy 
Development support for post deployment 
continued because of structural/payload limits 
and Independent Review Teams.  
Contracts were let to Lockheed for support and for 
the wing redesign.
Deployment and post deployment phase well 
executed, as evidenced by success of system in 
Vietnam and Israel.
I.  System and 
Program 
Management                  
Well managed systems engineering process 
systemic to the staff, including program 
manager, manufacturing and logistics.  
Tracked key TPM at all levels and directly 
managed budget and schedule.
Systems engineering was inherent in work 
content, not a separate budget entity.  Systems 
engineering was fundamental to the basic design 
process.  IRT membership developed by both 
Lockeheed and AF SPO.  
SPO role active in establishing requirements up 
to the contract award, then oversight of the 
development up until the establishment of 1971 
ASD Independent Review Team.  SPO 
responsible to initiate and manage IRTs.  
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Author Biographies 
JOHN M. GRIFFIN 
John Griffin is President, Griffin Consulting, providing systems engineering and program 
management services to large and mid sized aerospace firms.  He provides corporate strategy 
planning initiatives for company CEOs, reviews ongoing programs to assess progress and 
recommend corrective actions, and participates as an integral member of problem solving teams.  
He is active in numerous leading-edge technologies and advanced system development 
programs. 
Experience: 
• Director of Engineering, Kelly Space and Technology, Inc, San Bernardino, CA.  
Responsible for the conceptual design process for the development of a space 
launch platform. 
• Director, Development Planning, Aeronautical Systems Center, Wright-Patterson 
Air Force Base, OH.  Responsible for long-range planning for aeronautical 
systems. 
• Chief Systems Engineer, Engineering Directorate.  Provided engineering 
leadership and management for all Air Force aeronautical weapon systems. 
• Director of Engineering, B-2 Spirit Stealth Bomber, B-2 System Program Office.  
Provided engineering leadership and management from the program inception 
through first flight. 
• Source Selection Authority for two source selections 
• Chief engineer, F-15 Eagle Fighter 
• Chief Airframe Engineer, F-16 Fighting Falcon 
• Chief Airframe Engineer, Air Launched Cruise Missile 
Honors: 
• Awarded two Meritorious Service Medals 
• Awarded the Distinguished Career Service Medal for his 37 years of achievement 
upon retirement in 1997 
• Pioneer of Stealth, 1998 
• University of Detroit Mercy; Engineering Alumnus of the Year, 2002 
Education: 
• University of Detroit, Detroit MI, 1964:  Bachelor of Aero Engr. 
• Air Force Institute of Technology, WPAFB OH, 1968:  MS of EE  
• Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge MA, 1986:  Senior Executive 
Sloan Program. 
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Affiliations: 
• Founder (1993) and President (1993–1997), Western Ohio Chapter Senior 
Executive Association. 
• Co-founder (1995) and President (1996–1997), Defense Planning and Analysis 
Society.   
ERIC BUCHER 
Experience:  
Mechanical Engineer, Durability and Damage Tolerance 
 United States Air Force, Wright-Patterson AFB, OH 
• Aircraft Structures Branch, Student Engineer 
F/A-22 System Program Office, Aeronautical Systems Center  
− Coordinated solutions with contractors to resolve aircraft structural production 
variances 
− Constructed and briefed technical presentations of various work projects to upper 
management on a weekly basis  
− Managed, documented, and briefed structural Deficiency Reviews and Material 
Improvement Processes 
− Compiled and organized extensive test results from various static testing 
• Flight Mechanics & Structures Branches, Student Engineer 
Engineering Directorate, Aeronautical Systems Center 
− Constructed & processed CFD models for various aircraft systems 
− Collected & analyzed flight performance data for various re-engine programs 
− Learned basic aircraft weight and balance, durability and damage tolerance, 
and aircraft structures principles 
Education: 
• Ohio University, Athens, OH 
BS, Mechanical Engineering – Russ College of Engineering 
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Appendix 3 
Interviews 
Brad Allison, Lockheed 
Bill Arndt, Lockheed 
Michael Coalson, Air Force System Program Office 
David Dickenson, Lockheed Program Office 
B.J. Dvorscak, Lockheed Program Office 
Jean Gebman, Rand 
Abe Goldfarb, Air Force System Program Office 
Eddie Gustafson, Lockheed Program Office 
Harold Howard, Air Force System Program Office 
Joe Lusczek, Development Planning 
William Mar, Air Force Engineering 
Robert B. Ormsby, Lockheed Program Office 
Jerome Poncar, Air Force Thesis Student, in Air Force SPO 
Chan Posson, Air Force System Program Office 
Phil Settlemeyer, Lockheed 
O. Lester Smithers, Air Force System Program Office 
Timothy P. Sweeney, Air Force System Program Office 
William Swisher, Air Force System Program Office 
Chuck Tiffany, Air Force Engineering 
Howard Wood, Air Force System Program Office, and IRT 
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Appendix 4 
Titanium Trade Study 
A very important trade study that occurred early in the program addressed the amount of 
overall weight savings available to the designers if a significant amount of titanium were used.  
Figure A4-1 shows the findings graphically [9]. 
 
Figure A4-1.  Titanium Trade Study 
Unfortunately, the trade study did not accurately assess the risk of producing parts 
fabricated from titanium.  Because the findings were based on an ambitious assessment of the 
state of the art of the ability to design, and especially manufacture, titanium parts and 
subassemblies, this benefit was never realized.  In fact, they became an additional contributor to 
the weight growth that plagued the program during its initial development. 
The systems engineering process must validate the trade basis to eliminate downstream 
risk arising as a consequence of a trade study based on invalid technical basis.  In this case, the 
original proposal design incorporated 26,000 pounds of Ti, which grew to 65,000 pounds by 
August 1965.  After consulting with Clarence “Kelly” Johnson, Chief engineer of the Lockheed 
Skunk Works in Burbank, CA, and assessing that division’s experience with fabrication Ti for 
the SR-71, the Lockheed Marietta team reduced the Ti weight to 35,000 pounds by November 
1965 and again over the ensuing months, to a low of 6,325 pounds by April 1966.  When the 
design was finished, it incorporated 7,825 pounds of titanium [9]. 
The systems engineering process can allow for greater potential growth when factors 
such as uncertainty regarding the state of the art threaten the results of a study or analysis.  In this 
case, Lockheed did not learn until too late to incorporate technology maturation design and 
manufacturing assessments and tests because of the schedule requirements on the program.  The 
systems engineering process could be judged at fault for not seeking Lockheed Burbank’s 
opinion sooner. 
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Appendix 5 
C-5 System Concept Design Trade Studies 
Life-cycle cost was one of the central trade metrics in the early configuration 
assessments.  Ten-year operating cost and ten-year system costs were the underpinning for many 
of the decisions that sized the aircraft, as shown in the body of this case study.  The development 
phase’s emphasis on reliability and supportability was included in the contract through the 
system specification.  Additionally, the management process stipulated in AFSCM 375 required 
management techniques specifically aimed at trading life-cycle cost as a key figure of merit.  
After the contract was signed, Lockheed became less influenced by life cycle cost as a selection 
metric because of the punitive contract cost penalty on excessive weight and late delivery. 
Several configuration alternatives were reinvestigated in some detail for the CX- HLS, 
one of which was the lambda wing, shown in Figure A5-1.  The lambda wing offered excellent 
potential for high speed cruise Mach numbers, up to M=0.9.  But the requirements were 
narrowing to M=0.767, so the configuration was not pursued further because it was judged 5% 
more expensive [9]. 
 
 
Figure A5-1.  The High-Speed Lambda Wing Design Concept [9] 
There was also a study of a straight wing design and a modified straight wing, called the 
bat wing.  The results of the assessment are shown in Table A5-1.  The 2% improvement in 10-
year system costs was not sufficient to sway the decision from the baseline. 
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Table A5-1.  Cost Comparison of the Straight Wing Configurations [9] 
 25 deg Sweep 0 deg Sweep Bat Wing 
Procurement 1.00 1.00 0.94 
10 Year Opening 1.00 1.02 1.02 
10 Year System 1.00 1.01 0.98 
Note the use of life cycle and system costs as the selection metric.  
During the configuration studies conducted in 1961–1963, the Lockheed team built a 
simple yet very effective engineering mock-up at Ft. Benning, GA, to assess the utility of 
potential cargo bay configurations [5 (Ormsby)].  The mock-up was constructed of plywood and 
other common building materials and was used in conjunction with the operational military 
cargo handlers and the company design engineers to determine the optimal configuration for the 
using command.  Numerous inventory Army vehicles were made available to the company and 
the team assessed multiple ways of loading and unloading the cargo.  The company engineers 
and the MATS operators assessed cargo bay lengths, widths, and heights to develop the most 
useful internal layout.  This simple systems engineering tool was one of the most effective 
hands-on analyses/demonstrations of the early program and emphasizes how important 
seemingly simple learning tools can be.  The trade study sized the fuselage and finalized the 
floor configuration along with the knight’s visor nose to enhance the drive-through cargo 
timeline.   
Figure A5-2 [9] shows the number of sorties required for equipment and personnel for an 
Army division.  The study summarizes the results of the 17.5-foot-wide cargo bay (the eventual 
cargo bay width was 19.0 feet wide) and shows some of the typical data derived by the systems 
engineering process during the concept exploration phase of the program.   
 
 
Figure A5-2.  Sorties vs. Maximum Payload [9] 
Figure A5-3 shows the number of sorties necessary to carry the equipment for a typical 
division if the cargo aircraft had a cargo bay 17.5 feet by 120 feet (the final length was 121 feet).  
The payload ltd (limited) mechanized case loads the aircraft to the maximum for each sortie, 
while the higher, discontinuous line shows the actual case where the sorties are limited by floor 
space.  The higher line shows the case more representative of real-world usage.  The systems 
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engineering process is responsible for ensuring that trade study analyses use representative 
situations. 
 
Figure A5-3.  Trade Study for Cargo Bay Size and 10-Year Life Cycle Costs [9] 
A concurrent trade study assessed the impact of the configuration of the payload bay and 
the maximum payload on the total life cycle costs, shown in Figure A5-4.  This study showed a 
marked advantage to the large floor space.  For the large floor space, the 17.5 x 120 ft and 19.5 ft 
x 140 ft, showed marked advantages.  The larger floor space and wider cargo bay were 
eventually selected, based on this and other supporting analysis.  The C-5As and C-5Bs have a 
cargo compartment 19.0 ft x 13.5 ft x 121 ft. 
The trade study for the heavy mission payload shows a benefit in terms of relative costs 
for a payload capability over 205,000 pounds, so the aircraft was developed with the larger 
capability of 220,000 pounds as the specification requirement, as shown in Figure A5-4.   
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 Figure A5-4.  System Costs vs. Maximum Payload [9] 
A trade study to size the wing balanced maximum takeoff gross weight against wing 
loading.  This is a standard aircraft design analysis, but for the C-5A the takeoff requirements 
intersected the normal trade lines and showed a balance point for the proposal design.  This is 
depicted in Figure A5-5.  This study sized the wing and later influenced the flap design.  The 
alphanumeric designations are for different engine variants that existed prior to the Air Force’s 
selection of General Electric as the C-5A engine contractor. 
 
 
Figure A5-5.  Wing Loading Trade Study Results [9] 
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Lockheed’s original proposal, submitted to the Air Force in April 1965, was based on 
over three years of trade studies conducted by an experienced staff.  These studies developed a 
balanced vehicle that Lockheed claimed could meet or exceed all RFP requirements. 
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Appendix 6 
C-5 Operational Experience and Projected Upgrades 
A6.1  Operational Experience 
The C-5 has been an operational success by any figure of merit.  The Air Force inventory 
currently consists of 126 C-5 aircraft (74 C-5A, 50 C-5B, and 2 C-5C).  The C-5 fleet continues 
to play a key role in the nation’s strategic airlift capability.  During Operation Desert Storm, the 
C-5 fleet carried 46 percent of the total inter-theater cargo, yet flew only 29 percent of the cargo 
missions.  In Operation Iraqi Freedom, the C-5 fleet carried 48 percent of the total cargo, yet 
flew only 23 percent of the total cargo missions.  Table A6-1 compares several scenarios of the 
fleet operations to support distant theaters of conflict.  The performance of the C-5 fleet has 
always been noteworthy. 
Table A6-1.  C-5 Cargo Fleet Operations Compared to All Cargo Operations 
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A6.2  Current C-5A and C-5B Modernization Programs 
The C-5As and C-5Bs are undergoing two modernization programs, an avionics upgrade 
titled Avionics Modernization Program (AMP) and a program to improve reliability and 
incorporate modern commercial turbofan engines, titled Reliability Enhancement and Re-Engine 
Program (RERP).   
A6.2.1  Avionics Modernization Program 
The AMP will replace the engine instruments, flight instruments, and flight system 
components that have become unsupportable.  The program will install Global Air Traffic 
Management (GATM), Terrain Awareness of Warning System (TAWS), and Traffic Alert and 
Collision Avoidance System (TCAS).  The contract was awarded to Lockheed Martin in January 
1999 and the two modified aircraft are currently undergoing flight tests.  Certification is 
projected for October 2004.  The difference between the two cockpits is shown in Figure A6-1.   
 
 
Figure A6-1.  Cockpits from the Original Program Compared to AMP 
A6.2.2  Reliability Enhancement and Re-Engine Program 
RERP improves reliability, maintainability, and availability; increases the Mission 
Capable rate to 75 percent; and is projected to reduce total ownership cost by $8.1 billion.  The 
program will replace the power plants and identified unreliable/unsupportable systems, and 
improve payload capability/throughput and time-to-climb/one engine out climb gradient.  The 
program has selected the General Electric CF6-80C2L1F engine and has chosen Goodrich to 
design and produce the pylons.  An artist’s rendition of the aircraft after completion of the 
program is shown in Figure A6-2.  The current Air Force acquisition strategy stipulates the 
modification of the B models first.  The C-5Bs are 16 years younger than the A models, with the 
average age of a C-5B being 15 years compared to the C-5As’ average age of 31 years.  The 
Systems Development and Demonstration (SDD) contract was awarded to Lockheed Martin in 
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December 2001.  The program conducted Critical Design Review (CDR) in the second quarter of 
fiscal year 2004. 
 
Figure A6-2.  Artist’s Rendition of the C-5 with the New Engines 
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